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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EXPLOSION ACCIDENTS EVALUATION OF MV. GILI CAT II USING APOLLO 
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
Name   : Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
NRP   : 4213 101 046 
Department  : Marine Engineering 
Supervisor  : Dr. Eng. Trika Pitana, S.T., M.Sc 
Ir. Dwi Priyanta, M.SE 
 
Abstract 
 
The highest percentage of accident investigation (2007-March 2017) of National 
Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) is caused by fire or explosion (38%). MV. 
Gili Cat II had been exploded September 15th, 2016 at Padangbai port, Bali. MV. 
Gili Cat II is a passenger ship that serves from Padangbai Port, Bali to Gili Ketapang, 
Lombok. There were 35 passengers on board when ship was exploded. From this 
accident, there were 2 passengers got fatalities. Related to the explosion of MV. Gili 
Cat II, Root Cause Analysis and giving recommendation is needed (especially for 
electrical system and fuel oil system). Apollo Root Cause Analysis that used in this 
thesis. This is recommended for event / incident-based items of complex and higher 
significance. Recommendation of this thesis is referring the NCVS (Non-
Conventional Vessel Standard) Ch. V and NFPA refueling procedures. As the result 
of the analysis, the explosion is caused by bad electrical wiring system, static 
electricity around the tank and hull, there is no earthing system of the vessel, there 
was a fuel spill when refueling, venting pipe was not following standard, and using 
inappropriate materials, compartment below deck was not watertight and only 
using a spot welding on MV. Gili Cat II was found. The following recommendations 
related to Electrical system are earthing system should be fitted, battery should be 
mounted properly to prevent movement of the battery cause the motion of the 
vessel. The following recommendations related to Fuel oil system are material of 
flexible pipe is using SAE J 30 or equivalent, venting system shall be following 
standard, using an appropriate pump for filling the tank and done safely, tanks 
should be earthed, and follow the refueling procedures by NFPA. 
 
Keywords: MV. Gili Cat II, Apollo Root Cause Analysis (ARCA), electrical system, fuel 
oil system 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
EVALUASI LEDAKAN MV. GILI CAT II MENGGUNAKAN METODE APOLLO 
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
 
Name   : Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
NRP   : 4213 101 046 
Jurusan  : Teknik Sistem Perkapalan 
Dosen Pembimbing : Dr. Eng. Trika Pitana, S.T., M.Sc 
 Ir. Dwi Priyanta, M.SE 
 
Abstrak 
 
Persentase tertinggi dari investigasi kecelakaan (2007-Maret 2017) dari Komite 
Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT) disebabkan oleh kebakaran atau 
ledakan (38%). MV. Gili Cat II telah meledak 15 September 2016 di pelabuhan 
Padangbai, Bali. MV. Gili Cat II merupakan kapal penumpang yang melayani 
penyebrangan antara Pelabuhan Padangbai, Bali sampai Gili Ketapang, 
Lombok. Terdapat 35 penumpang di kapal pada saat kapal meledak. Dari 
kecelakaan ini, ada 2 penumpang yang menjadi korban jiwa. Terkait dengan 
ledakan MV. Gili Cat II, Root Cause Analysis dan pemberian rekomendasi sangat 
dibutuhkan (terutama untuk sistem kelistrikan dan sistem bahan bakar). Apollo 
Root Cause Analysis merupakan metode yang digunakan dalam skripsi ini. Metode 
ini direkomendasikan untuk kejadian / kejadian berdasarkan item yang kompleks 
dan signifikan tinggi. Rekomendasi pada tesis ini mengacu pada NCVS (Non-
Conventional Vessel Standard) Ch.V dan NFPA refueling procedures. Adapun 
hasil analisis dari ledakan tersebut disebabkan oleh sistem kabel listrik yang buruk, 
listrik statis di sekitar tangki dan lambung, tidak ada sistem pembumian kapal, ada 
tumpahan bahan bakar saat mengisi bahan bakar, pipa ventilasi tidak mengikuti 
standar, dan material yang digunakan tidak tepat, kompartemen di bawah dek 
tidak kedap udara dan hanya menggunakan pengelasan titik pada MV. Gili Cat II 
. Rekomendasi berikut yang terkait dengan sistem kelistrikan adalah sistem 
pembumian harus dipasang, baterai harus terpasang dengan benar untuk 
mencegah pergerakan baterai terhadap pergerakan kapal. Rekomendasi berikut 
yang terkait dengan sistem bahan bakar adalah material dari pipa fleksibel 
menggunakan SAE J 30 atau yang setara, sistem ventilasi harus mengikuti standar, 
penggunakan pompa yang sesuai untuk mengisi tangki dan dilakukan dengan 
  
xvi 
 
aman, tangki harus dibumikan, dan mengikuti prosedur pengisian bahan bakar 
oleh NFPA. 
 
Kata kunci: MV. Gili Cat II, Apollo Root Cause Analysis (ARCA), sistem kelistrikan, 
sistem bahan bakar 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Sea transportation is very important in human life. Ships are useful to 
connect us from one island to the other island. Ship is also useful as a 
means of transportation to ship a variety of human needs. However, Safety 
level of ship is one of concern because nowadays we often hear nor see all 
sorts of news about ship accidents. Safety is the most important things that 
must be addressed so that the ship accidents can be minimized or 
prevented. Until now, various national and international organizations 
continue to improve on the safety regulations of ship. Improvements are 
referred to accidents that have occurred previously such as construction 
problems, fire detection, safety equipment, evacuation procedures, training 
conducted for the crew, etc. Table 1. 1 shows the data of ships that have 
been investigated by NTSC (National Transportation Safety Committee) in 
2007 – March 2017. The main causes of accidents are Fire / explosions 
aboard the ship. Figure 1. 1 shows ship accidents percentage diagram from 
Table 1. 1 data. 
 
Table 1. 1 Vessels data were investigated by NTSC Year 2007 – March 20171 
No Year 
Number 
of 
Accidents 
Accidents Fatalities 
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1 2007 7 4 3 0 0 100 104 
2 2008 5 2 3 0 0 10 51 
3 2009 4 2 1 1 0 447 0 
4 2010 5 1 1 3 0 15 85 
5 2011 6 1 3 2 0 86 346 
6 2012 4 0 2 2 0 13 10 
7 2013 6 2 2 2 0 65 9 
8 2014 7 2 3 2 0 22 4 
9 2015 11 3 4 3 1 85 2 
10 2016 18 6 4 3 5 31 18 
                                                 
1 NTSC Accidents Data Year 2007 – March 2017 
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11 2017 4 1 3 0 0 24 0 
Total 77 24 29 18 6 898 629 
 
 
Figure 1. 1 Ship Accidents Percentage diagram 2 
 
From the statistical data above, we can see that Fire / explosions are the 
most frequent accidents in Indonesia. MV. Gili Cat II had been exploded on 
Thursday, September 15th, 2016. MV. Gili Cat II was departed from 
Padangbai, Bali to Gili Trawangan, Lombok. An accident occurred at 09.35 
near of Padangbai Port, Bali. There were 35 passengers onboard when ship 
exploded. MV. Sondex 1 help MV. Gili Cat II to pull the vessel to Pier 3 
Padangbai Port. From this accident, there were 2 passengers got fatalities. 
Figure 1. 2 is a picture of MV. Gili Cat II. 
 
                                                 
2 NTSC Accidents Data Year 2007 – March 2017 
31%
38%
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Accidents Type (2007-March 2017)
Sink Fire / Exploded Collision Others
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Figure 1. 2 MV. Gili Cat II 3 
 
This thesis will be investigated to determine the cause of explosion on MV. 
Gili Cat II. Investigations were carried begins with Root Cause Analysis RCA). 
Apollo Root Cause Analysis (ARCA) – RealityCharting is used in this thesis. 
Root cause Analysis is a wide variety method used to identify the main 
causes of problems (tracing problem to their origin). RCA also can helps 
answer the question of why the problem happened in the first place, which 
in turn, and can helps us to prevent the recurrence. ARCA is recommended 
for event / incident-based items of complex and higher significance. 
RealityCharting is a simple causal process whereby one asks why of a 
defined problem, answers with at least two causes in the form of an action 
and condition. Then asks why of each answer and continues asking why of 
each stated cause until there are no more answers. The answer or causes is 
supported with evidence or use “?”. To complete the apollo root cause 
analysis, there are 4 steps that should be followed. Four steps that should 
be followed are: Define the problem, Create Reality or Cause-Effect Chart 
(Chart is created supported with evidence), Identify possible effective 
solution, implement best solution and finalize the report.  
 
After analyzing the root cause of the accidents, next stage is recommending 
an electrical system and fuel oil system regarding the existing condition by 
following standard. Recommendation of fuel oil system and electrical 
system are action to prevent explosion of MV. Gili Cat II. System 
recommendation of this thesis is according to NCVS (Non-Conventional 
Vessel Standard) and NFPA. FOS and Electrical system recommendation 
already complete, it can use for preventing similar case or it can be used 
for other parties. 
                                                 
3 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
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1.2 Problem Statement  
From the explanation above, so the main problem will be discussed is as 
followed.  
1. How to determine the root cause of the explosions using ARCA?  
2. How is the recommendation of fuel oil system of an outboard engine? 
3. How is the recommendation of electrical system of an outboard 
engine? 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are followings.  
1. To reanalyze the root cause of the explosions on the ship. 
2. To evaluate fuel oil system of an outboard engines according to NCVS. 
3. To evaluate electrical system of an outboard engines according to 
NCVS. 
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
The Contribution of this study are followings.  
1. Provide recommendation of fuel oil system of an outboard engines. 
2. Provide recommendation of electrical system of an outboard engine. 
3. Could be used for related parties to determine the act of prevention 
and mitigation of explosions on allied ships. 
 
1.5 Research Limitation 
For this thesis can be focused and organized, then made a couple of 
limitations problem as follows. 
1. Research on the ship of MV. Gili Cat II. 
2. Research on analysis and evaluation of explosion on board, focusing on 
root cause analysis of explosion from the deck. 
3. Evaluate design only for fuel oil system and electrical system.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE STUDY 
 
 
2.1 Research Objectives 
2.1.1 MV. Gili Cat II Description 
MV. Gili Cat II is a passenger ship that serves from Padangbai (Bali) to Gili 
Trawangan (Lombok). This ship constructed in Australia in 2001. MV. Gili 
Cat II has a main material using an Aluminum. In 2013, PT. Indonusa 
Segara Marine defined as companies holding ISM certificates. MV. Gili Cat 
II operated by PT. Samudera Ekspedisi Aman in 2014. Figure 2. 1 below 
shows MV. Gili Cat II Condition. MV. Gili Cat II have general data as follows:  
 
• Length Overall    : 11,69 m 
• Breadth Molded   : 3,42 m 
• Draught    : 0,60 m 
• Depth     : 0,90 m 
• Gross Tonnage    : 6 T 
• Net Tonnage     : - 
• Type      : Passenger Ship 
• Flag     : Indonesia 
• Production Year   : 2001 
• Production Location   : Australia 
• Construction Material   : Aluminum 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 MV. Gili Cat II 1 
 
                                                 
1 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
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This ship does not have a certificate for a class like a machine certificate 
and hull. MV. Gili Cat II is a ship with a single hull (monohull). This boat 
can carry 35 passengers with 4 crews. The controller for steer and 
Revolution Per Minute (RPM) lever are located at the navigation space. 
Control consoles are installed aboard also with other indicators as well. 
Deck of the ship using aluminum plate are installed semi-permanently, 
especially on the stern of accommodation space which aims to simplify 
the maintenance and troubleshoot of the lower deck. 
 
MV. Gili Cat II uses 3 units of outboard engines type Suzuki DF300 4 stroke 
types with power of 300 HP. Ship engine configuration have a maximum 
rotation will be able to provide power to the ship's speed reached to 45 
knots. But the ship operates at an average speed of 20-25 knots 
(Padangbai - Gili Trawangan can be reached within 1.5 hours). Fuel ship 
engines using gasoline, but in the last 3 months aboard using a fuel 
mixture of gasoline and pertalite.  
 
Maximum fuel tank capacity of 1500 liters (this tank has been modified 
with the previous design). Fuel tank connected to the engine bypassing 
the filter components of primary and secondary filter then the engine. 
Figure 2. 2 below shows about sketch placement of Fuel Tank on MV. Gili 
Cat II. Fuel tank connected to the engine bypassing the filter components 
of primary and secondary filter then the engine. Fuel tank and engine 
components connected using flexible rubber hose. There are three lines 
from the tank to the intake of each outboard motor. Its consists of 4 
sections of flexible hose: intake tank - connectors, connector - primary 
filter, primary filter - secondary filter, a secondary filter - the outboard 
motor. 
 
 
Figure 2. 2 Sketch placement of Fuel Tank 2 
                                                 
2 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
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Three ship propulsion units (outboard engines) coupled in series. Control unit 
installed at the front of the cabin ship that becomes one with the passenger cabin. 
Pair cables are installed through long pipe that stretched under the boat deck 
from control room to stern of the ship. To navigate, Shipmaster aided by one GPS 
unit permanently installed on ships and 1 VHF radio unit is available to 
communicate. 
 
MV. Gili Cat II has many types of life saving equipment. In accordance with the 
safety of passenger ship certification No. PK.001/05/KSOP.Pbl-2016 and RE 
certificates – Inspection Certificate Fire Fighter Extinguisher No: 010/PMK-
YS/II/BL-16, MV. Gili Cat II using lifesaving equipment. That lifesaving equipment 
are described on Table 2. 1. 
 
Table 2. 1 Lifesaving equipment of MV. Gili Cat II 3 
No Equipment Quantity 
Volume / 
Capacity 
Checked 
1 
Firefighting equipment type 
dry powder (Pressure) 
2 bottles 6,0 kg 
February 26th 
2016 
2 Inflatable Life raft 5 pieces 48 people 
February 25th 
2017 
3 Lifebuoys 2 pieces 2 people May 25th 2018 
4 Lifejackets 
45 
pieces 
45 people May 25th 2019 
 
2.1.2 Accident Chronology 
MV. Gili Cat II had been exploded on Thursday, September 15th, 2016. An 
accident occurred at 09.35 GMT+08:00(Greenwich Mean Time) near 
Padangbai Port, Bali. The chronology of the accidents of MV. Gili Cat II 
explained in Table 2. 2 below. In this explosion accidents, there were 2 
passengers got fatalities, some passengers got injuries. Table 2. 3 
explained about detail casualties from the accidents. 
 
Table 2. 2 Chronology of Explosion4 
No. Date 
Time 
(GMT+08:00) 
Condition 
1 
September 14th, 
2016 
14:00 
670 L Fuel was filled in Padangbai Port, 
Bali 
                                                 
3 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
4 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
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No. Date 
Time 
(GMT+08:00) 
Condition 
2 
September 15th, 
2016 
08:05 
Captain and 3 crews checked the 
condition of ships. 
3 
September 15th, 
2016 
08:20 
Captain check navigation tools, safety 
equipment and documents. 
4 
September15th, 
2016 
08:30 
Captain requested permission to lean on 
Pier 3 Port Padangbai. 
5 
September15th, 
2016 
09:00 
Passengers began boarding the ship. (35 
Passengers) 
6 
September15th, 
2016 
09:25 
The ship departed to the port of Gili 
Trawangan, Lombok. 
7 
September15th, 
2016 
09:35 
The engine rotation speed increased to 
3500 rpm and the speed starts to rise. 
The sound of a loud explosion from the 
stern of the ship and there was white 
smoke for 30 seconds. 
8 
September15th, 
2016 
09:37 
Captain lowered speed to 0 knots, turn 
off the engine, then ask for help from 
nearby vessels. 
9 
September15th, 
2016 
09:40 
Coming four speedboats (KM. Wahan 
Gili Ocean 1, MV. Marina Srikandi, MV. 
Sondex 1 and MV. Mahi-mahi Dewata). 
10 
September15th, 
2016 
09:40 
MV. Mahi-mahi Dewata ask permission 
attached to the right side for the 
evacuation, but was rejected by the 
Captain of MV. Gili Cat II. 
11 
September15th, 
2016 
09:40 
Captain had decided to ask for help 
from MV. Sondex 1 to pull the vessel 
MV. Gili Cat II to Pier 3. 
12 
September15th, 
2016 
09:50 
MV. Gili Cat II arrived at the port of 
Padangbai. 
 
Table 2. 3 Casualties Data of Accidents 5 
Casualties Fatalities 
Major 
Injuries 
Minor 
Injuries 
Safe Total   
Ship crew - - 1 3 4   
Passenger 2 6 7 20 35   
Total 2 6 8 23 39   
                                                 
5 MV. Gili Cat II NTSC Draft Report, 2016 
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Note:  
- 1-person fatalities when an explosion. According to witnesses, the passenger 
fatalities due to collide with the roof of the accommodation space when the 
explosion occurred. 
- 1-person fatalities while being taken to hospital 
 
2.2 Fire Process 
2.2.1 Fire Theory 
Fire is as oxidation event where the convergence of air, and the heat may 
result causing property damage or human injury or even death, (NFPA 30, 
1992). Fire also can generally be interpreted as an uncontrolled event 
unbreak of fire which could endanger the safety of lives and property (DKI, 
2008). Fire is the rapid oxidation of the material in the chemical process 
of combustion. It produces heat, light, and various other chemical reaction 
results. Fire formed from a chemical reaction (oxidation) which is 
composed of three elements, those are: heat, fuel, and air. It forming the 
flame commonly called the fire triangle. Figure 2. 3 explained about 
materials to forming a Fire / explosions. 
 
Figure 2. 3 Fire Triangle (Spruce, 2016) 
 
If there is any one of those elements does not exist or are not on balance 
is sufficient, so Fire will not be formed. Fire triangle principle can be used 
as a basic for fire protection and fire prevention. When all three elements 
forming the Fire so the fire will not happen immediately, but only in the 
form of incandescence. For the formation of a fire there must be an 
element / support component, that is a chain of chemical 
reactions (chemical chain reaction). The theory commonly known as fire 
pyramid (fire tetrahedron). This theory is illustrated in Figure 2. 4 Early 
discovery of the fire tetrahedron theory originated from research and 
development of fire ectinguisher materials. Those materials are dry 
chemical fire extinguisher (chemical flour) and halons (halon 
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hydrocarbon). The extinguisher types can break the chain reaction of the 
fire process continuity. 
 
 
Figure 2. 4 Fire Tetrahedron (NFPA 921, 2004) 
 
Chemical chain reaction is an event where there are three elements that 
react chemically with each other, thus resulting not only incandescent, but 
the form of flame or combustion events. 
 
2.2.2  Fire Classification 
Fire classification is an important thing to do. It can prevent of Fire or 
extinguish Fire. Classification of Fire can be distinguished base on sources 
that cause a fire. This classification is expected election of fire extinguisher 
according to the type of fire. So the Fire can be extinguished effectively 
and in accordance with established procedures. 
 
2.2.2.1 General Fire Classification 
Fire classified according to the regulation (PerMen, 1980) classified fire 
into 4 categories namely A, B, C, D. While (NFPA 30, 1992) establishes 
five categories of types cause of the fire, that is class A, B, C, D and K. In 
fact, several countries assign additional classification with the class E. 
 
The classification is as follows:  
1. Class A 
Fire involving solid objects except metal. Example: Fire wood, paper, 
cloth, plastic, etc. Extinguish Fire of this class are using: sand, soil / 
sludge, powder extinguishers, foam and water. 
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2. Class B 
Fire that caused by a flammable liquids or gases.  Example: Kerosene, 
diesel, gasoline, LPG / LNG, cooking oil. Extinguishers that can be 
used are: dry powder, foam, water in the form of spray / mist.  
3. Class C 
Fire that caused by a voltage of electrical installation. Example: 
electrical Breaker and other household appliance that uses electricity. 
Extinguisher that can be used are: carbon dioxide (CO2), dry powder. 
In this extinction are prohibited from using water. 
4. Class D 
Fire on solid metal objects such as: magnesium, aluminum, sodium, 
potassium, etc. Extinguisher that can be used are: smooth or dry sand, 
special dry powder. 
5. Class K 
Fire caused by the material due to the high concentration of grease. 
Fire of this type occur in the kitchen. Fire arising in the kitchen can be 
categorized in fire class B. 
6. Class E 
Fire caused by short circuit of the electronic equipment. Extinguisher 
that can be used are: dry powder, but has a risk of damage to 
electronic equipment. Because dry powder has sticky 
properties. More appropriate to use the fire extinguisher made from 
clean agent. Clean agent has any benefit like extinguish fire fast, 
effectively, safe, and environmentally friendly. 
 
2.2.3.2 Flammable Liquid 
The cause of the fire on the ship mostly from the engine room. In the 
engine room is easy to find of any flammable liquids. Flammable liquids 
are classified into several types, according to: 
 
1. Flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 100° F 
Flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 100° F can be divided into 
several classes. This classes explained in Table 2. 4, as follows: 
 
Table 2. 4 Flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 100° F (NFPA 30, 1992) 
Class Flashpoint Examples 
Class II > 100° F and <140° F Diesel fuel, fuel oil, kerosene, motor oil 
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Class Flashpoint Examples 
Class IIIA > 140° F and <200° F 
Furfural, linseed oil, mineral oil, oil-based 
paints 
Class IIIB > 200° F Ethylene glycol, glycerin, neatsfoot oil 
 
2. Flammable liquid with a flashpoint above 100° F 
Flammable liquid with a flashpoint above 100° F can be divided into 
several classes. This classes explained in Table 2. 5, as follows: 
 
Table 2. 5 Flammable liquid with a flashpoint above 100° F (NFPA 30, 1992) 
Class Flashpoint 
Boiling 
Point 
Examples 
Class IA <73° F <100° F 
Ethyl ether, heptane, pentane, propylene 
oxide, vinyl chloride 
Class IB <73° F > 100° F 
Acetone, ethanol, gasoline, isopropyl 
alcohol, methanol, methyl ethyl ketone, 
octane, toluene 
Class IC 
> 73° F and 
<100° F 
All 
boiling 
points 
Isobutyl alcohol, mineral spirits, styrene 
monomer, turpentine, xylene 
 
2.2.3 Fire stages 
 
 
Figure 2. 5 Stages of Fire (Hartin, 2007) 
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Basically, a fire can be formed by three elements, those are oxygen, heat, 
and fuels (combustible materials). The Fire can be divided into several 
stages, those are:  the stages of fire appear, the fire grew, the peak fire, 
and the fire outages. Figure 2. 5 below illustrates the stages of a fire 
starting a fire appear until the fire extinguished: 
 
The following is an explanation of each of the stages of fire: 
1. Stage Fire Appears 
Stage of fire appeared is an early stage of the fire. This stage begins 
with a chemical reaction between the three elements forming the fire 
are heat, oxygen, and combustible materials. At this stage, fire can 
easily be extinguished and even fire can be extinguished by itself 
when the fire cannot reach the next stage of Fire (elements forming 
the fire diminished, etc.). At this stage, suppression or escape can be 
determined. 
 
2. Stage Fire Grows 
Growth can occur if the fire extinguishing measures are not carried 
out immediately or have not done at all. This stage can be recognized 
by combustible materials started to burn so heat (temperature) 
increases. When combustible materials are burned. It causes 
flashover (other combustible materials are combusted also due to the 
high heat). If there are people around the fire area, it could potentially 
lead victims are trapped, injured or even death. 
 
3. Stage Peak Fire 
Fire peak occurs when all combustible materials ignite a whole so that 
the temperature of the fire reached its peak. Temperatures are so 
high that at this stage would be very dangerous for anyone trapped 
inside. 
 
4. Stage of fire outages 
Fire outages stage is the stage of Fire that take the longest duration 
among the other stages. Levels of forming a fire like O2 (oxygen) and 
the flammable material has begun to decline. However, if there are 
combustible materials unlit, it can immediately surround the fire 
could potentially cause a new flame. This stage is also the potential 
to cause a backdraft, which is an explosion that occurs due to oxygen 
supply suddenly. This can happen if a fire enclosed space suddenly 
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opened when the fire took place, so the fire more difficult to 
extinguish. 
 
2.2.4  Explosion 
An explosion is a rapid increase in volume and release of energy. Release 
of energy in extreme manner are usually with the generation of high 
temperatures and the releases of gas. Explosion is the sudden conversion 
of potential energy (chemical or mechanical) into kinetic energy. It 
product and release of gas under pressure. These high-pressure gases 
then do mechanical work, such as moving, changing, or shattering nearby 
materials. (NFPA 921, 2004) 
 
There are two major types of explosions with which investigators are 
routinely involved: mechanical and chemical. The difference between 
those types are the source or mechanism by which the explosive pressures 
are produced. Mechanical explosions are explosions with high-pressure. 
Mechanical explosions produce gas a purely physical reaction. A purely 
mechanical explosion release of the stored high-pressure gas, such as 
compressed air, carbon dioxide, or oxygen. Bleves are sub-type of 
mechanical explosion. Bleves is the most common type explosion happen. 
It is type of mechanical explosion that will be encountered most 
frequently by the fire investigator. Figure 2. 6 is one example of bleves.  
 
 
Figure 2. 6 Bleves (TechnoKontrol, 2017) 
 
Chemical explosion can involve solid combustibles or explosive mixtures 
of fuel and oxidizer. More common to the fire investigator will be the 
propagating reactions involving gases, vapors, or dusts mixed with air. 
Combustion explosion is the most common of the chemical explosions. 
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Combustion explosion caused by the burning of combustible 
hydrocarbon fuels.  
 
Before a fire or explosion can occur, three conditions must be met 
simultaneously. A fuel (combustible gas) and oxygen (air) must exist in 
certain proportions. It along with an ignition source, such as a spark or 
flame. The ratio of fuel and oxygen that is required varies with each 
combustible gas or vapor. The minimum concentration of a combustible 
gas or vapor necessary to support its combustion in air. It is defined as 
the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) for that gas. Below this level, the mixture 
is too “lean” to burn. The maximum concentration of a gas or vapor that 
will burn in air is defined as the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL). Above this 
level, the mixture is too “rich” to burn. The range between the LEL and UEL 
is known as the flammable range for that gas or vapor. Figure 2. 7 
explained the detail data of UEL and LFL of gasoline. 
 
 
Figure 2. 7 LFL and UEL List of gasoline 6 
 
Accidents of MV. Gili Cat II caused an explosion of fuel oil system. This 
fuel oil system is using a gasoline. We can see that the LEL and UEL for 
gasoline are 1.4% and 7.6%. From the data above, if the capacity of fuel 
tank of MV. Gili Cat II is 1500 l. Explosion can happen only if the fuel has 
been vaporized within 21 – 114 liters.  
 
2.3 Fire Prevention 
Prevention as part of efforts to reduce the possibility of things that are not 
desirable. Similarly, fire prevention, it is intended to be operated ship 
feasible to operate and avoid the danger of fire. Thus, the regulations 
                                                 
6 www.pertamina.com 
16 
 
 
 
concerning fire prevention made so that hazards cause of the fire can be 
avoided. The regulations on fire prevention in the ship listed to the (ILO, 
1996). These regulations are as follows: 
 
2.3.1 Smoke 
• Smoking is only allowed in special places for smoking and 
instructions as well as warnings about the smoking ban should be put 
in places that are easily visible. 
• Disposing of matchsticks and cigarette butts were still burning out of 
place is dangerous. Box cigarette butts must be provided and placed 
in a special place for smoking. 
• The crew should be reminded of the dangers of smoking in the 
bedroom. 
 
2.3.2 Electrical equipment and others 
• People who do not have the authority is not allowed to handle the 
work associated premises electrical equipment and others. 
• All electrical damage to the equipment, supplies, or power lines 
should be reported immediately to the electrician or the person 
responsible for handling electrical work. 
• Each power line (circuit) which overload is not allowed because it can 
cause a fire. 
• Portable heaters are not allowed to be used except in special 
circumstances and must be accompanied by a warning to users of the 
dangers that can be caused. 
• Private portable heaters are not allowed to be used under any 
circumstances. 
• All portable electrical equipment should be disconnected from the 
power line, if it is not used anymore. 
• All electrical equipment belonging to private accommodation areas 
must use a plug of electricity corresponding to the plug hole (socket) 
that based on the standards. 
• Power cable connection and plug holes branched (multi-socket plug) 
should not be used in residential spaces for connecting multiple 
electric equipment on the plug or socket. 
• If the crew to use the equipment or portable lights, they must be able 
to ensure that the cables are through the door, hatches, manholes, 
etc., it should be protected and an insulation will not be damaged by 
the closing of the holes or closing the door, closing hatches (covers) 
or lids. 
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• The crew members are not allowed to install antennas (radio / 
television) adjacent to the ship radio antennas (vessels' s aerials) 
• The crew did not permit to make improvements (unload) aircraft 
radio, compact disc player or other equipment without unplug the 
power plug, and before connecting the power cable again on the 
plug hole should be checked by an expert / electrician. 
• Chart (Wall charts) which gives instructions on emergency first Life 
Saving to the crew that an electric shock (Suffered electrical shock) 
must be affixed in places where appropriate on the vessel, all crew 
must understand and be able to follow the procedures that have been 
listed on the chart / alerts. 
 
2.3.3 Laundry and wet clothes 
Cautious attitude should be done when drying clothes. Clothes should not 
be hung directly on or near the heater and not allowed to dry clothes in 
the engine room. 
 
2.3.4 Flammable goods (Spontaneous combustion) 
Garbage, cloth-rags and used goods (rubbish) such as clothes stained by 
paint, oil, and paint thinner, etc. are dangerous if left scattered because 
these items can cause fire by themselves (spontaneously combust). These 
items must be stored in bins that have been determined (proper dustbins) 
until these items can be disposed of safely. 
 
2.3.5 Kitchen (Galley) 
The kitchen has a fire hazard so fire blanket and fire extinguisher 
equipment must be available and ready to use. The use of water is not 
permittable in fire extinguish derived from cooking oil in the cooking area 
 
2.4 Apollo Root Cause Analysis – RealityCharting 
2.4.1 General Root Cause Analysis 
Root Cause Analysis is a wide variety methods used to identify the causes 
of problems (tracing problem to their origin) and helps answer the 
question of why the problem happened in the first place, which in turn, 
and can helps us to prevent the recurrence. Many of the Root Cause 
Analysis methods can be utilize in basic problem solving, however they 
have received criticism for being too basic to analyze root causes to the 
depth that is needed to ensure that solutions are identified and the 
problem is solved.  
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Traditional root cause analysis (RCA) is used to retrace the chain of causes 
that led to event, so it can find the single cause that set everything else in 
motion, known as the “root cause”. The basic theory if RCA is finding and 
eliminating the single root cause so it will solve the problem.  But after 
years of investigation in nuclear field of 1979 Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Power Plant partial meltdown, Dean L. Gano realized that traditional RCA 
method were not working. Traditional RCA methods weakness are the 
problem solving were people-centric and subjective rather than principle-
based and objective. There are some methods that used in traditional RCA 
methods such as Linear thinking, Categorization, Storytelling, and 
Common Sense. Then Dean L. Gano made seven steps to problem solving 
effectively. These seven steps are: 
 
1. Define the problem. 
2. Determine the known causal relationships to include the actions and 
conditions of each effect. 
3. Provide a graphical representation of the causal relationships to 
include specific action and conditional causes. 
4. Provide evidence to support the existence of each cause. 
5. Determine if each set of causes is sufficient and necessary to cause 
the effect. 
6. Provide effective solutions that remove, change, or control one or 
more causes of the event. Solutions must be shown to prevent 
recurrence, meet our goals and objectives, be within our control, and 
will not cause other problems. 
7. Implement and track the effectiveness of each solution. 
 
2.4.2 Apollo Root Cause Analysis – Reality Charting 
Apollo Root Cause Analysis – RealityCharting is used in this thesis. ARCA 
is recommended for event / Incident-based items of complex and higher 
significance. There is some benefit of apollo root cause analysis – 
realitycharting: 
 
1. Create a Common Reality: A RealityCharting is produced showing all 
the known causes and their inter-relationships. Because all 
stakeholders can see these causal relationships in the RealityCharting, 
buy-in of the solutions is readily attained. 
2. Eliminated Recurring Problems: identifying solutions that are within 
the organization’s control, prevent recurrence, and meet the 
organization’s goals and objectives. 
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3. Get a Define Result: The result in clear causal connections between 
your solutions and the defined problem. 
4. Address Any Size Problem: scalable to any problem, large or small.  
5. Eliminate Assumption: The evidence requirement for each cause 
ensures that there is no “story telling” involved.  
 
Comparison the Apollo RCA – RealityCharting with the other various 
methods or tool RCA in use today. Figure 2. 8 showed below is a result of 
comparison of RealityCharting methods and other RCA methods or tools. 
 
 
Figure 2. 8 Comparison of Selected RCA Methods and Tools (Gano, 2011) 
 
RealityCharting is a simple causal process whereby one asks why of a 
defined problem, answers with at least two causes in the form of an action 
and condition, then asks why of each answer and continues asking why of 
each stated cause until there are no more answers. The answer or causes 
is supported with evidence or use “?”. A search for the unknown is 
launched and the process is repeated several times until the cause-and-
effect chart, called RealityChart. It is created to show all the known causes 
and their interrelationships. All causes then examined to find a way to 
change them with a solution that is within your control, prevent 
recurrence, meets a goals and objectives, and does not cause other 
problems. The result is clear causal connections between your solutions 
and the defined problem then the solutions is readily attained. To 
complete the apollo root cause analysis, there are 4 steps that should 
followed. Four steps that should followed are:  
 
1. Define the problem. 
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• What, When, and Where. 
• Significant: Safety, Environmental, Cost, etc. 
• Frequency of the problem. 
2. Create chart (Reality or Cause-Effect Chart). Chart is created 
supported with evidence. 
• Iterative process. 
• Look for an appropriate end to each part. 
3. Identify possible effective solution. 
• Brainstorm. 
• Not just the favorite solution. 
4. Implement best solution and finalize the report. 
• Complete correction action. 
 
But before it started to define the problem, it should gather information 
first. All the information like drawing, picture, evidence preservation, 
conduct interviewers, create timeline / sequence of events, etc. 
  
A Realitychart or cause-effect chart is a process that we do after we define 
the problem. Cause-effect has a principle or we can say as 4 characteristics 
of cause-effect:  
 
1. Cause & Effect are the same thing. 
2. Each effect has at least two causes in the form of action & condition. 
Figure 2. 9 is an example of simple RealityCharting. The definition of 
action are causes that interact with conditions to cause an effect. 
Conditions are causes that exist in time prior to an action bringing 
them together to cause an effect. 
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Figure 2. 9 Reality Charting Simple Example (Gano, 2011) 
 
3. Causes & Effect are part of an infinite continuum of causes. 
• Causes: Like jigsaw puzzle (no edges). 
• More connection will make a better picture. 
• Each cause can be the beginning and the end. 
• More connection will make a bigger chart then give more 
opportunity to place more solutions. 
 
4. An effect exists only if its causes exist in the same space and time 
frame. 
 
 
Figure 2. 10 Reality Charting - Fundamental Elements (Gano, 2011) 
 
For making any reality charting we must follow some elements. Figure 2. 
10 shown above is a fundamental element of realitycharting. These 
fundamental elements for reality charting are:  
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1. For each primary effect ask “why” 
2. Look for cause in action and conditional. 
3. Comment all causes with “caused by”. 
4. Support all causes with evidence. 
5. Each caused path with “?” or a reason for stopping.  
 
There are four reasons for stopping in creating root cause analysis using 
RealityCharting. 
1. Desired Condition: This is the most common reason for stopping. The 
event was pursuit one or more goals. If you reach your goal, there is 
no need to continue asking why. If your goal is faulty, that is another 
matter. 
2. Lack of Control: This reason is outside members or members 
organization control. 
3. New Primary Effect: This reason is often used as an interim stopping 
point because you have a separate team working on the details of this 
cause. When they are done, you can easily import their Realitychart 
into the final analysis. 
4. Other Cause Paths More Productive: After we recommend some 
solution but it cannot be implemented because it is not productive or 
cost is too high. So, it doesn’t make any sense to continue down there 
cause paths and spend more time and money when you already have 
effective solutions. 
 
There are some rules that used for every evidence in creating a 
RealityCharting. These rules for realitycharting evidence are:  
• Applying evidence to the chart. 
• Difficulties recognizing evidence. 
• Rules for acceptable evidences are: 
o Sense evidence  : sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell. 
o Inferred evidence  :  
- Known by repeatable casual relationships. 
- Photos, videos, trendchart, logbook, lab sample, etc. 
- Inferred evidence should always be verified. 
After we create any realitychart, the next process is identifying possible 
solutions. The possible solutions criteria that can accepted are: 
1. Prevent recurrence. 
2. Within your control. 
3. Must appropriate with goal & objectives. 
4. It would not make any new other problem. 
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There are 4 steps to make an effective solution. These are: 
1. Challenge each cause by asking how we can remove, change or 
control it and offer solutions. 
2. Do not restrict ideas – brainstorming. 
3. Check each solution using criteria. 
4. Implement the solutions that best pass the criteria. 
 
How to make a solution for RealityCharting? These are the solution 
processes for RealityCharting: 
• Challenge each cause & offer a solution. 
o Start in upper right-hand corner. 
o What can be done to remove, change, or control. 
o Brainstorming. 
o May have to revise chart. 
o Think outside the box. 
• Identify best solution. 
o It must meet the solution criteria. 
o The best solution is often applied to conditional causes. 
  
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“This page intentionally blank” 
25 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 General 
The methodology is a step that must be done on an activity to achieve 
certain objectives, in this case is the thesis. In this thesis, writing a good 
methodology became one of the most important points. It is because in 
this methodology will explain what processes should be done, starts from 
the formulation explanation of the problem, the data what should have, 
then how the data is processed, until purpose of the thesis. 
 
3.2 Methodology Flowchart 
The stages are carried out in the writing of this thesis methodology will be 
described in the form of a flowchart. Flowchart shown in Figure 3. 1 and 
Figure 3. 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Methodology Flowchart 
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3.3 Background and Problem Statement 
Identifying the problems is to determine what are the problem statements. 
Problem statement should be related with the case. This stage is very 
important cause we must know why these problems are worthy to be used 
as material in thesis. 
 
In this phase, the background of writing and the problem statement will be 
described. The background of this thesis is that the accident MV. Gili Cat II 
and the high rate of Fire / explosions of all accidents aboard ships. Problem 
statement of this thesis are what is the root cause of this case and how to 
mitigate it. After problem statement is done, then we need to continue with 
collecting and understand literature study. 
 
Figure 3. 2 Methodology Flowchart Continue 
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3.4 Literature Study 
The Literature study is a stage that explain the basic theories that will be 
used in this thesis. Sources used in the writing of literature on this thesis 
comes from paper, books, standard and code, news, and another similar 
thesis.  
 
In this thesis, there are some literature study need to collect and 
understand. Those literature study are MV. Gili Cat Accidents Description, 
Fire Process, Fire Prevention, and Apollo Root Cause Analysis Methods.  
After all the literature study are collected and understood in detail, we can 
continue with data collecting. Data collecting should be related with the 
case and literature study also.  
 
3.5 Collecting Data 
Collecting Data are needed to complete the thesis. Collecting data is a 
critical point of this thesis, cause all data will support for writing this thesis. 
Collecting data in this thesis are coming from National Transportation 
Safety Committee (NTSC). 
 
Collecting data that needed in this thesis are the description MV. Gili Cat II, 
MV. Gili Cat II accident reports, general arrangement, daily report of MV. 
Gili Cat II. Collecting data are needed to process of completing this thesis. 
 
The description MV. Gili Cat II, MV. Gili Cat II accident reports are useful to 
create root cause analysis using Apollo root cause analysis methodology. 
Then, the description of MV. Gili Cat II, general arrangement, daily report 
of MV. Gili Cat II are needed to creating Fuel Oil System (FOS) and Electrical 
System.  
 
3.6 Apollo Root Cause Analysis 
The description of MV. Gili Cat II and MV. Gili Cat II accidents report will be 
an input to create a root cause analysis. Apollo Root Cause Analysis is a 
stage to determine main cause (root cause) of the accidents (Fire). Apollo 
root cause analysis will be assisted with realitycharting program.  
 
There is some step to complete an Apollo Root Cause Analysis method. 
Those steps are: Define the problem, creating chart, identify possible 
solution, implement best solution, and finalize the report. Report in this 
thesis will be created automatically.  
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The first step of this methods is defining the problem. Define the problem 
is a step about detail description of the cases. Detail description are about 
what, when, where of the cases happened, what significant we concern 
about (safety, environmental, cost, etc.), and the frequency of the cases 
happen. The next stage is creating a realitychart. Create realitychart should 
be done in detail. Each cause of the cart should be supported with evidence. 
Evidence of the causes could be coming from sense evidence (sight, sound, 
taste, touch, and smell) or inferred evidence (photos, videos, trendchart, 
logbook, etc.) 
 
The third step is identifying possible solution. Possible solutions criteria that 
can be accepted are prevent recurrence, must appropriate with objectives, 
it would not make any new other problem. After that, implement best 
solution. Implementing solution should be assessed.  Solution assessment 
of MV. Gili Cat II is done by giving a questionnaire to the expert (NTSC). 
After all the step, the last one is creating report. Report of the cases will be 
done automatically by realitycharting program.  
 
The results of this analysis are: what are the root cause of this problem, 
what are possible solution that can be implemented, and how is the report 
of the analysis.  
 
3.7 System Recommendation 
The description of MV. Gili Cat II, general arrangement, daily report of MV. 
Gili Cat II are needed to support of system recommendation. 
Recommendation in this thesis is related to condition that are not following 
based on standard (NCSV Chapter V - Machinery & Electrical) especially on 
fuel oil system and electrical system. 
 
Recommendation of fuel oil system and electrical system are action to 
prevent explosion of MV. Gili Cat II. System recommendation of this thesis 
is according to NCVS (Non-Conventional Vessel Standard) and NFPA. After 
FOS and Electrical system recommendation already completed, it can use 
for preventing similar case or it can be used for other parties. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This phase is a summary of this thesis, as a result of this thesis and what 
can be learned from this thesis. The final step is to make the conclusion that 
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the whole process has been done before as well as provide answers to 
existing problems. 
 
This phase is an act or suggestions are being made to reduce the possibility 
of similar dangers. Mitigation suggestion is a solution to prevent recurrence 
of similar accidents. Conclusion and recommendation from this thesis are 
what are the root cause of the problem, what are the implemented solution, 
how is the design of fuel oil system and electrical system according to 
NCVS. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
4.1  General 
In the data analysis and discussion, there are several steps that need to 
be explained. Steps that need to be explained are about the methods 
of Apollo Root Cause Analysis (ARCA). Then it will continue with the 
design process of the fuel system and the electrical system on the ship. 
The data required to support the work of this thesis include the MV. Gili 
Cat II Description, MV. Gili Cat II Accidents Report, General 
Arrangements, and Daily Report of MV. Gili Cat II. 
 
An initial stage is to identify documents that have been obtained. Those 
documents are MV. Gili Cat II Description, MV. Gili Cat II Accidents 
Report, General Arrangements, and Daily Report of MV. Gili Cat II. That 
information can be used as evidence relating to the explosion MV. Gili 
Cat II. 
 
The next stage is to process the data that has obtained. Data will be 
processed using Apollo Root Cause Analysis (ARCA) methods. 
RealityCharting application usage is to support the Apollo Root Cause 
Analysis method. In ARCA methods, there are several steps that need to 
be done. The following stages include: define the problem, create chart, 
identify possible effective solution, implement the best solution, finalize 
the report.  
 
In the first stage of doing that ARCA method Define the problemis to 
explain events (accidents) are as detailed as possible. Then proceed with 
the Create Chart. Creating chart are made must be included with the 
evidence that already exists. After creating chart is complete, then 
proceed with the Identify possible solution. At this stage, any solution 
will be identified should be related to the case being dealt with. There 
are some criterias in identifying possible solution. These criteria are 
given solution must prevent recurrence of the problem, within your 
control, must appropriate with goals and objectives, and it will not make 
any other / new problem. After identifying of possible solution has been 
completed then followed by implementing those solutions. Implement 
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best solution can be done through assessment solution. Assessment 
solution was performed to assess any solution that can be implemented 
in a related case. After finished assessing any solution that can be 
implemented, then continue with the finalized report. Finalize the report 
is the creation of a report on the results, which has been obtained at 
each stage. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
In this section will be discussed on the analysis of data obtained 
previously. This data is used to support root cause analysis process. This 
collected data is useful in Apollo Root Cause Analysis methods to define 
the problem, creating charts and provide evidence on each chart. Here 
are the data that has been collected: 
 
4.2.1 MV. Gili Cat II Description 
MV. Gili Cat II Description is a general data about the ship. General 
data such as ship particular, ship propulsion systems, machinery and 
fuel systems, data about the crew, passenger load information, and 
safety equipments. 
 
• The main data of ship: MV. Gili Cat II is a passenger ship that 
serves from Padangbai (Bali) - Gili Trawangan (Lombok). The ship 
was built in 2001 in Australia. This ship is made of aluminum. MV. 
Gili Cat II have general data as follows: 
o Overall Length  : 11.69 m 
o Breadth Molded  : 3.42 m 
o Draft    : 0.60 m 
o Depth   : 0.90 m 
o Gross Tonnage   : 6 T 
o Net Tonnage   : - 
o Type     : Passenger Ship 
o Flag    : Indonesia 
o Production Year  : 2001 
o Production Location  : Australia 
o Construction Materials : Aluminum 
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• Ship Propulsion Systems 
Ship steering system consists of two wires that connect to the 
mechanical system of the outboard motor propeller. This ship 
propulsion motor has 3 units and installed in series. Ship 
machinery control is on the console mounted on the front of a 
ship's cabin. Pair cable of ship steering are installed through a 
long pipe that cross on under the deck of the ship. Navigation 
MV. Gili Cat II conducted by a captain assisted by 1 GPS units that 
are permanently installed and 1 unit VHF radio to communicate. 
 
• Machinery and Fuel Systems 
Motors that used on this ship are 3 units of Suzuki DF300 four-
stroke type . One unit of outboard motors has power of 300 HP. 
Configuring the ship's engine at maximum rotation can provide 
power until speeds in 45 knots. However, these motors are 
operated at an average speed in 20-25 knots. At this speeds, the 
ship can travel between Padangbai - Gili Trawangan within 1.5 
hours. Figure 4. 1 is an overview of the steering and control engine 
console from MV. Gili Cat II. 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Steering and Control Engine Console 1 
 
Fuel used on this engine is gasoline. But in the last 3 months, MV. 
Gili Cat II uses a fuel mixture of gasoline and pertalite. The fuel is 
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stored in tanks that are on the lower deck with a capacity of 1500 
liters. As for filling the fuel tank carried by the crew manually. 
 
• Crew Data 
At the time of the explosion of the ship, the MV. Gili Cat manned 
by four crews. The crew consists of a Captain (skipper), Chief 
Engineer, and 2 sailors. The crew  certifications can be seen on 
Table 4. 1, as follows: 
 
Table 4. 1 Crew Data of MV. Gili Cat II2 
No. 
Ship's 
crew 
Diploma / 
Certificate 
Date released 
SEA (Seafarer's 
Employment 
Agreement) 
1 Captain 
ANT-IV 
March 07th, 
2013 
PT. Wallacea 
Jalesveva Lestari 
(03/04/2016) 
BST 
May 27th, 
2015 
SCRB 
November 
22nd, 2011 
AFF 
November 
29th, 2011 
MC 
November 
30th, 2011 
MEFA 
November 
16th, 2011 
ISM CODE 
September 
24th, 2012 
SAT 
February 10th, 
2015 
2 
Chief 
Engineer 
ATT-V 
September 
11th, 2012 
- 
(06/25/2013) 
BST 
May 22nd, 
2015 
AFF 
May 13rd, 
2015 
SAT RFPWER 
August24th, 
2015 
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No. 
Ship's 
crew 
Diploma / 
Certificate 
Date released 
SEA (Seafarer's 
Employment 
Agreement) 
3 Sailor I BST 
January 04th, 
2014 
PT. INDONUSA 
SEGARA MARINE  
(05/01/2014) 
4 Sailor II BST 
February 29th, 
2016 
PT. Wallacea 
Jalesveva Lestari  
(03/04/2016 
 
• Cargo (Passenger) Information 
The number of passengers on MV. Gili Cat II has 39 people 
consisting of 35 passengers and 4 crews. 35 passengers are 
foreign tourists from United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, 
Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and 
Portugal.  
 
• Safety Equipments 
MV. Gili Cat II has been equipped with a variety of safety 
equipment. In accordance with the Passenger Ship Safety 
Certificate No. PK.001 / 05 / KSOP.Pbl-2016 and RE certificates - 
Fighter Fire Extinguisher Inspection Certificate No: 010 / PMK-YS 
/ II / BL-16, MV. Gili Cat II equipped with safety equipment 
described in Table 4. 2 following.  
 
Table 4. 2  MV. Gili Cat II Safety Equipment 3 
No. Types Amount 
Volume / 
Capacity 
Tested 
1 
Powder extinguisher 
types (Pressure 
2 tube 6.0 kg February 26th, 2016 
2 
Life raft bloating 
(Inflatable Liferaft) 
5 pieces 48 people February 25 th, 2016 
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No. Types Amount 
Volume / 
Capacity 
Tested 
3 
The buoy helper 
(lifebuoys) 
2 pieces 2 persons May 25 th, 2016 
4 
Jackets helper 
(lifejackets) 
45 pieces 45 people  May 25 th, 2016 
 
4.2.2 MV. Gili Cat II Accidents Report 
MV. Gili Cat II exploded on Thursday, September 15th, 2016. The MV. 
Gili Cat II was departed from Padangbai, Bali to Gili Trawangan, 
Lombok. An accident occurred at 09:35 near of Padangbai Port, Bali. 
There were 35 passengers onboard when the ship exploded. MV. 
Sondex 1 MV help. Gili Cat II to pull the vessel to Pier 3 Padangbai 
Port. In this accident, there were two passengers got fatalities. The 
detailed chronology of  MV.Gili Cat II explosion has been described in 
Chapter II.1. 
 
4.2.3 General Arrangements 
General Arrangement is a general design of entire compartments of 
the ship. In general arrangements, it is figuring about ships design 
seen from a top view and side view. It is easier for users to be able to 
calculate the actual vessel dimension in accordance with the scale of 
the images used. The General Arrangement on this ship is Figure 4. 2, 
as follows.  
 
 
Figure 4. 2 MV. Gili Cat II General Arrangements 4 
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4.2.4 Daily Report of MV. Gili Cat II. 
Daily Report on MV. Gili Cat II is an important document containing 
the  that can be trusted with a record considered carefully and 
meticulously arranged, each event is recorded. 
 
4.3 Apollo Root Cause Analysis 
After analyzing and identificate the data that has been obtained, the 
next step is to evaluate the occurrence of an explosion on the vessel 
MV. Gili Cat II. Aim of evaluation is to find out what are the root cause 
of the explosion. In ARCA method, there are 5 steps that must be 
followed, those are: Define Problem, Create Chart, Effective Solution 
Possible Identify, Implement Best Solution, Finalize the report. 
 
4.3.1 Define the problem 
Define the problem is the first step in Apollo Root Cause Analysis 
methods. At this stage, every detail of the problems will be explained, 
who will analyze the problem, an important note in the problem, the 
source of the data (reference), etc. Details explained at this stage will 
be divided into five stages. These stages include: problem definiton, 
team members, notes, references, and rules check. Problem definition 
will explain "what is the problem", when (date, time) the problem 
happens, where (location), significance (safety, environment, cost, etc). 
In this case, the problem of definition of RealityCharting application 
are explained in Appendix 1. 
 
Problem Definition in this case is: 
What   : Ship Accident (Explosion) – MV. Gili Cat II 
When   : - 
Date  : September 15th, 2016 
Time  : 09:30 GMT+08:00 
Where   : Bali 
Location  : Padangbai Port, Bali 
Significance  : - 
Safety  : Fire / Explosion 
Environment : - 
Revenue  : - 
Cost  : - 
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Frequency  : 1 
 
Then proceed to fill in the information about team members. Team 
members are those who would analyze the problems proficiency level. 
The information to be filled include name, email, and personal 
information is require. Appendix 1 will explain how your team 
members on a charging visualization RealityCharting application. 
 
Team members in this case is: 
• Ricard Diago Sambuaga   : College Student  
• Dr. Eng. Trika Pitana, ST., M.Sc.  : 1st Supervisor 
• Ir. Dwi Priyanta, M.SE.   : 2nd Supervisor 
• Aleik Nurwahyudy   : NCVS Investigator 
 
The next stage is to fill important notes of this case. After fill an 
important notes, so next step was filling reference. This reference 
contains any data sources that we use to supporting this process of 
root cause analysis. On Appendix 1 will explain about visualization to 
fill a RealityCharting reference on the application. As you create your 
chart, the software automatically Identifies the which causes are 
affected by the rule violations and will probably need further work. 
These are quickly intervening Viewed by selecting the Rule Violations 
cause attribute, located on the workspace above the cause of 
headings. 
 
There are some references that author used in this thesis. References 
that used in this thesis are: 
• NTSC MV. Gili Cat II Draft Report 
• Dean L. Gano. RealityCharting – Seven steps to Effective Problem 
Solving and Strategies for Personal Success 
• NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 921 
• NCVS (Non-Conventional Vessel Standard) Chapter V 
 
The Rules Check window Provides a place to monitor seven chart of 
construction rules, identify individual violations for each offending 
cause, initiate or bypass the rules check and select an advanced rule 
checking to perform. 
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1. The "Empty Cause" rule checks the cause Realitychart for any 
empty boxes. 
2. The "unconnected Cause" rule checks the Realitychart for any 
unconnected causes. 
3. The "Action / Condition Type" rule checks to the make sure all 
causes have been identified as an action or condition cause. 
4. The "Action-Condition Requirement" rule checks to the make sure 
the effect every action has at least one cause and one cause 
condition. 
5. The "Conjunction" Identifies any rule conjunctions to help Ensure 
causes Contain only one noun-verb statements and are not telling 
a story. 
6. The "Evidence" rule checks to the make sure every cause has 
evidence to support it. 
7. The "Point of Ignorance" rule checks to the make sure the all cause 
paths have a defined ending. 
 
Appendix 1 will explain how your visualization of RealityCharting rules 
check on the application, as follows. After rules check process has 
been completed and every rules check status has passed so all define 
problem stages has been completed. It will proceed with the next step 
which is to the create chart. 
 
4.3.2 Create Chart 
Create chart is the second step in performing of apollo root cause 
analysis method. There is an important things in creating chart of 
ARCA methods. Each chart should be supported by an evidence. 
Creating charts in ARCA method has several rules, as follows: 
1. Cause and effect are the same thing. 
2. Each effect has at least two causes in the form of action and 
condition. Figure II. 8 is an example of simple RealityCharting. 
3. Causes & Effects are part of an infinite continuum of causes. 
4. An effect exists only if its causes exist in the same space and time 
frame. 
 
In the first stage is to choose a top event / primary effect. Primary 
Effect is a major failure that occurs in an event. MV. Gili Cat II explosion 
accident selected as the top event / primary effect. 
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In the second stage followed by determining the cause of the effect. 
Create charts in ARCA methods have some fundamental elements. 
Fundamental elements include: For each primary effect ask "why", 
cause is created consisting of condition and action, comment all 
causes with "the caused by", support all causes with evidence, and 
each caused path with "?" Or a reason for stopping. Numbering of 
each chart is useful for reading the chart. Appendix 1 will describe 
about numbering of each chart in this case. 
 
MV. Gili Cat II explosion location is in below of the deck. Location of 
the explosion is beside of the fuel tank. Explosion can happen caused 
by saturated gas are accumulated in that below deck. After saturated 
gas accumulated, then there is mixing between air (oxygen) and 
saturated gas (Fuel) and an Igniter. Because of these three elements 
so explosion can happen. Figure 4. 3 is described location of the 
explosion and the layout of the ship. The discussion of this case is 
described in Figure 4. 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3 Detail Location of the Explosion5 
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Figure 4. 4 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 1 6 
 
1.0 Why the Ship Accidents (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II can 
happen? 
1.1 (A) Heat 
1.2 (C) Flammable Material 
1.3 (C) Oxygen 
 
In the third stage is continued on Figure 4. 5 given the question why 
1.1 (A) Heat in the second stage can happen. The answer of this 
question are as follows: 
 
1.1 Why Heat can happen?  
1.1.1 (A) Static electrical around of the tank and hull 
1.1.2 (C) Bad electrical wiring system  
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Figure 4. 5 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 2 7 
 
In the fourth stage is continued on Figure 4. 6 and Figure 4. 11 given 
the question why on every answer in the third stage. Figure 4. 12 is the 
causes of Figure 4. 11. The answer of each question is as follows: 
 
1.1.1 Why are there a static electricity in the area of the tank 
and hull?  
1.1.1.1 (C) There is no earthing system (grounding) – STOP 
(More Info Needed) 
1.1.1.2 (A) oxygen result dust particles being attracted to 
the rubbed surfaced – STOP (More Info Needed) 
 
 
Figure 4. 6 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 3 8 
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There are evidences for each cause. Those evidences for tightening 
battery using belt tied manually and wood boards and sponges used 
as a prop for battery are described in Figure 4. 7 and Figure 4. 8.  
 
 
Figure 4. 7 Evidence for Tightening Battery Manually9 
 
 
Figure 4. 8 Evidence for Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery10 
 
Evidence for switch & contact pole are not protected with isolator, 
battery spaces is not in a good condition, and there is a gap between 
battery spaces described in Figure 4. 9 and Figure 4. 10. 
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Figure 4. 9 Evidence for contacts pole condition (without isolator)11 
 
 
Figure 4. 10 Evidence for battery spaces is not in good condition12 
 
1.1.1 Why are there a bad electrical wiring system? 
1.1.1.1 (A) Ship crews did not check well – STOP (Lack of 
Control) 
1.1.1.2 (A) Ship crews did not check regularly – STOP (Lack 
of Control) 
1.1.1.3 (C) Battery compartment is not in good condition 
1.1.1.4 (C) Switch and contacts pole are not protected with 
isolator – STOP (Lack of Control) 
1.1.1.5 (C) Broken Socket – STOP (Lack of Control) 
 
                                                 
11 NTSC Investigation 
12 NTSC Investigation 
45 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 11 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 4 13 
 
1.1.1.1 Why battery compartment is not in good condition? 
1.1.1.1.1 (A) Ship crews tightening battery using belt tied 
manually – STOP (Desired Condition) 
1.1.1.1.2 (C) There is a gap between battery spaces and 
refueling pipeline space – STOP (Lack of Control) 
1.1.1.1.3 (C) Battery spaces is not in good condition – STOP 
(Lack of Control) 
1.1.1.1.4 (C) Wood boards and sponges as a prop for battery 
– STOP (Desired Condition) 
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Figure 4. 12 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 5 14 
 
In the fifth stage is continued on Figure 4. 13 given the question why 
there are 1.2 (C) Flammable Material in the second stage. The answer 
of this question is as follows: 
 
1.1 Why are there flammable materials? 
1.1.1 (A) Ship crews were spilling fuel when refueling  
1.1.2 (C) Gasoline on the LEL and UEL Range (1,4% - 7,6%) 
1.1.3 (C) Refueling pipe is not in good condition 
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Figure 4. 13 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 6 15 
 
In the sixth stage is continued on Figure 4. 14 given the question Why 
1.2.1 (A) Ship crews were spilling fuel when refueling and Figure 4. 15 
Why there are 1.2.2 (C) Gasoline on the LEL and UEL Range (1,4% - 
7,6%). Answers of this question are as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. 14 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 7 16 
 
1.2.1 Why ship crews were spilling fuel when refueling?  
1.2.1.1 (A) Refueling manual not carefully - STOP (Lack of 
Control) 
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1.2.1.2 (C) There is no appropriate procedures for refueling  
- STOP (Desired Condition) 
 
 
Figure 4. 15 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 8 17 
 
1.2.2 Why there are gasoline on the LEL and UEL range (1,4% 
- 7,6%)? 
1.2.2.1 (A) Air could not be circulated - STOP (New Primary 
Effect) 
1.2.2.2 (C) Saturated gas accumulated 
1.2.2.3 (C) No fuel indicator on tank – STOP (Lack of Control) 
 
 
Figure 4. 16 Evidence for Air could not be circulated 18 
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Evidence for Air could not be circulated is described in Figure 4. 16. 
Figure 4. 16 describe that the connector of venting pipe is corroded. 
Dirt inside pipe caused by corrosion in venting pipe connector made 
air circulation was not working well. Saturated gas accumulated and 
gas cannot release.  
 
In the seventh stage is continued on Figure 4. 17 given the question 
why are there 1.2.2.2 (C) Saturated gas accumulated in the sixth stage. 
The answer of this question is as follows: 
 
1.2.2.2 Why are there saturated gas accumulated?  
1.2.2.2.1 (C) Venting pipe is not in good condition  
1.2.2.2.2 (C) Venting pipe mounting moved position – STOP 
(Desired Condition) 
1.2.2.2.3 (C) There is no venting pipe in compartment beside 
fuel tank – STOP (Desired Condition) 
 
 
Figure 4. 17 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 9 19 
 
In the eight stage is continued on Figure 4. 18 given the question why 
on every answer in the seventh stage. The answer of each question is 
as follows: 
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Figure 4. 18 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 10 20 
 
1.2.2.2.1 Why the venting pipe is not in good condition?   
1.2.2.2.1.1 (C) Venting pipe folded 
1.2.2.2.1.2 (C) Venting pipe connection is not in good 
condition 
 
Evidence for venting pipe mounted moved position is described in 
Figure 4. 19. Figure 4. 19 describe that the previous venting pipe 
mounted was not used anymore and ship owner do the modification 
of venting pipe mounting. The modification made caused by MV. Gili 
Cat II operate always in trim by stern condition but a new modification 
venting pipe system is not work well, said NTSC Investigator. Present 
venting pipe design is not work well so saturated gas cannot release 
through the air. An unused venting pipe is closed by bolt. 
 
 
Figure 4. 19 Evidence for venting pipe moved position21 
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In the ninth stage is continued on Figure 4. 20 given the question why 
are there 1.2.2.2.1.1 (C) Venting pipe was folded in the eight stages. 
The answer of this question is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. 20 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 11 22 
 
1.2.2.2.1.1 Why venting pipe was folded?  
1.2.2.2.1.1.1 (A) Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly – STOP (Desired Condition) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.2 (C) Material is not in good condition 
1.2.2.2.1.1.3 (C) Lack of an appropriate pipeline – STOP 
(Lack of Control) 
 
There are evidences for each cause. Those evidences for venting pipe 
easily removable, plastic pipe inserted between two pipe connections, 
and there is an insulation tape blocking the hole in the pipe 
connection are described in Figure 4. 21, Figure 4. 22, and Figure 4. 23.  
 
                                                 
22 RealityCharting 
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Figure 4. 21 Evidence for Venting pipe connector bad condition23 
 
Bad condition of venting pipe connector cause saturated gas of fuel 
cannot release well. Corrosion of the connector made  
 
 
Figure 4. 22 Evidence for plastic pipe inserted between two pipes24 
 
                                                 
23 NTSC Investigation 
24 NTSC Investigation 
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Figure 4. 23 Evidence for insulation tape blocking venting pipe hole25 
 
In the tenth stage is continued on Figure 4. 24 given the question why 
are there 1.2.2.2.1.2 (C) Venting pipe connection is not in good 
condition in the eight stages. The answer of this question is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. 24 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 12 26 
 
1.2.2.2.1.2 Why the pipe venting pipe connection is not in 
good condition?  
1.2.2.2.1.2.1 (A) venting pipe is easily removable – STOP 
(Lack of Control) 
1.2.2.2.1.2.1 (C) Plastic pipe is inserted between two 
pipe connection - STOP (Desired Condition)  
                                                 
25 NTSC Investigation 
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1.2.2.2.1.2.2 (C) There is an insulation tape blocking the 
hole in the pipe connection - STOP (More 
Info Needed)  
 
Evidence for venting pipe folded described in Figure 4. 25. Venting 
pipe folded are caused by design is not good. Bad design makes 
venting pipe folded forcibly so saturated gas cannot release. Venting 
pipe is using flexible hose. If the flexible hose is folded forcibly time 
by time the pipe condition is getting worse. 
 
 
Figure 4. 25 Evidence for venting pipe folded27 
 
In the eleventh stage is continued on Figure 4. 26 given the question 
why are there 1.2.2.2.1.1.2 (C) Material is not in good condition in the 
ninth stages. The answer of this question is as follows: 
 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1 Why the material is not in good condition? 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1.1 (A) Ship crews did not check well - STOP 
(Lack of Control) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1.2 (A) Ship crews did not check regularly - 
STOP (Lack of Control) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1.3 (C) Venting pipe location is difficult, to 
checked - STOP (Lack of Control) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1.4 (C) Not using material standards - STOP 
(More Info Needed) 
 
                                                 
27 NTSC Investigation 
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Figure 4. 26 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 13 28 
 
 
Figure 4. 27 Evidence for Material is not in good condition (Cracking)29 
 
Evidence for material is not in good condition in Figure 4. 27. Figure 4. 
27 describe that fuel pipe is cracking and brittle. Cause of this 
condition, fuel can get out from cavities of the cracking pipe. This 
condition is very dangerous and become fire/explosion possibility. 
                                                 
28 RealityCharting 
29 NTSC Investigation 
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Fuel pipe cracking possible happen caused by less maintenance, 
location is difficult to checked, and not using standard material.  
 
In the twelfth stage is continued on Figure 4. 28 given the question 
why on every answer in the fifth stage. The answer of that question is 
as follows:  
 
2.2.3 Why the refueling pipe is not in good condition?  
1.2.3.1 (A) Ship crews did not check well - STOP (Lack of 
Control) 
1.2.3.2 (A) Ship crews did not check regularly - STOP (Lack 
of Control) 
1.2.3.3 (C) Not using material standards - STOP (Desired 
Condition) 
 
 
Figure 4. 28 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 14 30 
 
In the thirteenth stage is continued on Figure 4. 29 given the question 
why are there 1.3 (C) Oxygen in the second stage. The answer of this 
question is as follows: 
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Figure 4. 29 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 15 31 
 
1.3 Why there is Oxygen?  
1.3.1 (A) Air come into compartement under deck – (Lack of 
Control) 
1.3.2 (C) No gastight compartment 
 
In the fourteenth stage is continued on given the question why there 
is  1.3.2 (C) no gastight compartment in the thirteenth stage. The 
answer of that question is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. 30 Chart (Explosion MV. Gili Cat) part 16 32 
 
1.3.2 Why the compartement is not watertight? 
1.3.2.1 (C) Connection between hull wrang not exhausted - 
STOP (More Info Needed)  
1.3.2.2 (C) Welding on the deck only using spot welding - 
STOP (More Info Needed) 
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There is an evidence for each cause. Evidence for air come into 
compartement under deck, connection between hull wrang is not 
exhausted, and welding no the deck only using spot welding are 
described in Figure 4. 31.  
 
 
Figure 4. 31 Evidence for welding only using spot welding33 
 
4.3.3 Identify Possible Effective Solution 
Identify Possible Effective Solution is a phase that we must follow to 
continue after creating chart. At this stage, team members will identify 
any effective solution that can be recommended. The solution 
provided by the team members. Possible solution will be selected that 
can be implemented in accordance with the judgment by expertise. In 
recommending solutions in Apollo root cause analysis methods, there 
are several criteria check. The criteria check and possible solution of 
MV. Gili Cat II explosion of RealityCharting application are described 
in Appendix 1. 
 
There are some rules or criteria that should be followed before 
identifying any possible solution. Those criteria are as follows: 
• Does this solution prevent recurrence? 
• Is this solution within your control? 
• Does this solution meet your goals and objectives? 
• Does this solution cause other unacceptable problems that you 
are aware of? 
 
                                                 
33 NTSC Investigation 
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In this thesis, there are some possible solution that could be 
implemented regarding to MV. Gili Cat II explosion. Those possible 
solutions are: 
• Recommendation about electrical system design 
• Using standard material 
• Recommendation about piping system design 
• Crews was given special training 
• Ship owner should be recruiting the crew that has been certified 
• Work procedures based on ISM Code 
• Welding according to standards 
 
4.3.4 Implement best solution  
Implement best solution is the stage where members choose the best 
solutions that have been recommended. There are some assessments 
that need to be considered for choosing a solution that will be 
implemented. Solution assessment that has been recommended is 
intended that consider which solution is best. The best solution would 
be implemented on the case under evaluation. In the solution 
assessment, there are several criteria. These criteria include total cost, 
ease of implementation, the probability of recurrence, and etc. As in 
each of these criteria have rank and weight. Ranking is the value of 
each of these criteria that contain limitation on any number on any 
criteria. In conducting this assessment, there are several examples of 
criteria, but not all of the criteria I use in this solution assessment. 
Solution assessment example that I have done in this method is 
described in appendix 1. 
 
There are some criteria that used in this thesis. Those criteria are 
probability of recurrence, ease of implementation, effectiveness, and 
total cost. Each criterion has score. Criteria and score that used in this 
thesis are selected by discussing with NTSC investigator. Detail of 
criteria and score of RealityChrating solution assessment described in 
Table 4. 3. Detail Solution Assessment questionnaire will be attach in 
Appendix 3. 
 
Table 4. 3 Solution Assessment Criteria and Score Detail34 
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No. Criteria Score 
1 Probability of Recurrence 1 (>75%) to 4 (<10%) 
2 Ease of Implementation 1 (Difficult) to 4 (Easy) 
3 Effectiveness 1 (Not Eff.) to 4 (Very Eff.) 
4 Total Cost 1 (Expensive) to 4 (Low-Cost) 
 
The description of each criterion is:  
• Probability of Recurrence: The probability of same cases or similar 
cases recurred. The point is, if a solution is implemented then how 
is the probability or how likely the occurrence of the case can 
happen again. 
• Ease of implementation: Ease of implementation is how difficult 
the solution can be implemented (Technical Difficulties). 
• Effectiveness: Effectiveness is how effective is the solution when 
implemented. 
• Total cost: Total cost is how much the cost needed if the solution 
is implemented. 
 
In conducting this assessment, the process will be done by expertise 
in the field. The assessment will be done by spreading questionnaires 
to some respondents. NTSC is selected to be respondents. Results of 
solution assessment will be described as Table 4. 4 following:  
 
Table 4. 4 Solution Assessment 35 
Solution 
Criteria 
(1) 
Criteria 
(2) 
Criteria 
(3) 
Criteria 
(4) 
Total 
Recommendation about 
electrical system design 
2,67 3,33 3,67 2,33 12,00 
Using standard material 3,33 3,67 4,00 3,00 14,00 
Recommendation about 
piping system design 
3,33 3,33 4,00 2,67 13,33 
Crews was given special 
training 
2,67 3,67 3,33 2,67 12,33 
Ship owner should recruiting 
the crew that has been 
certified 
2,67 3,67 3,67 2,67 12,67 
                                                 
35 RealityCharting 
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Solution 
Criteria 
(1) 
Criteria 
(2) 
Criteria 
(3) 
Criteria 
(4) 
Total 
Work procedures based on 
ISM Code 
3,33 3,33 3,33 2,33 12,33 
Welding according to 
standards 
3,33 3,00 4,00 2,33 12,67 
 
4.3.5 Finalizing the report 
Finalize report is the last stage in the completion of Apollo Root Cause 
Analysis method. In the RealityCharting software, report creation 
process will be completed automatically. Creating report automatically 
process is one of the advantages of this method, for the manufacture 
report will be much easier than using other methods. Creating report 
process may complete if every component in the first stage to the 
fourth stage have been completed. Here is the result of any incident 
report on the application RealityCharting. Finalize report described in 
Appendix 2. 
 
4.4 Electrical System Recommendation 
Conditions that are not in accordance with the standards on the MV. 
Gili Cat II electrical system became the main cause of the explosion. 
These main caused are igniter (Igniter, Flammable Material, and 
Oxygen). The conditions that are not in accordance with the electrical 
system in the vessel are: 
• Bad Electrical wiring system 
1) Tightening battery using a belt tied manually 
2) Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery 
3) Switch and contacts pole are not protected with isolator 
4) Battery Spaces is not in good condition 
5) There is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline 
space 
6) Brocken Socket 
• Static electricity around the tank and hull 
• There is no earthing system 
 
The electrical equipment that will be evaluated and given 
recommendations in this thesis is only related to the general electrical 
requirements, the extra low voltage electrical system and the battery, as 
well as recommendations that support the electrical system. 
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Recommendations on this system refer to NCVS Chapter V (Machinery 
& Electrical) standard. Here is an explanation of the recommendation 
regarding electrical system in this thesis. 
 
4.4.1 General Electrical Requirements 
1. Design 
Electrical installations should be such that: 
• All electrical   auxiliary   services   necessary   for maintaining   
the ship in normal operational   and habitable   conditions   
will be ensured   without   recourse   to the emergency source 
of electrical power;  
• Electrical services essential for safety will be ensured under 
various emergency conditions; and  
• The safety of passengers, crew and ship from electrical 
hazards will be ensured 
 
2. Safety Protection 
Protection must be provided to prevent inadvertent contact by 
personnel and passengers with parts of the electrical installation. 
Minimization of risk of fire, damage, and physicals injury must 
include overcurrent protection, appropriate insulation, 
appropriate construction, fault indication, safety trips, and 
effective operational and maintenance procedures. 
 
3. Isolation 
Electrical installations, and parts of installations, must be provided 
with isolation devices to prevent or remove hazards associated 
with abnormal operation (e.g. faults such as short circuits) and to 
allow maintenance of electrical equipment. 
 
4. Battery 
Battery installations must be designed and installed to eliminate 
or minimize risks associated with the emission of gases, corrosive 
fluids, electro-chemical corrosion, movement, mechanical 
damage, and exposed terminals.  
 
5. Earthing and Bonding 
• Earthing 
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1) Earthing systems 
a. Method of earthing 
The method of earthing for a.c. systems at voltages 
greater than 50 V Shall be: 
i. A multiple earthed neutral (MEN) system; or  
ii. An isolated earth system. 
b. The method of earthing for d.c. systems shall be: 
i. A negative earth; or 
ii. An isolated earth. 
 
Notes: An installation may include mixed methods of 
earthing. Earthing systems should be mixed only after 
consideration of the possible fault currents in each 
system. 
 
2) Main earth connection 
In a vessel with a hull constructed wholly of metal, the 
main earth conductor shall be taken from the earth 
terminal, bar, or link at the main switchboard to an earth 
electrode solidly connected to the hull. In a vessel with a 
hull not constructed wholly of metal, the main earth 
conductor shall be taken from the earth terminal, bar, or 
link at the main switchboard to an earth electrode solidly 
connected to an earth plate the main earth conductor 
shall run in as direct a manner as practicable and shall 
not be connected to any other appliance. 
 
3) Multiple Earth Neutral (MEN) earth system 
In an MEN earthing system, the neutral to earth bond 
should be made at each generator. Note:  The MEN bond 
is switched out of the system because the shore 
power/vessel supply changer over switch operates in all 
live conductors. 
 
4) Isolated earthing system 
An electrical system isolated from earth shall employ an 
earth fault monitor or insulation resistance monitor. 
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Where earth lamps are used for this function, the lamps 
shall: 
a. Be of a filament type; 
i. not exceed 30 W; 
ii. be of the same color; 
b. Be placed not more than 125mm apart; and 
c. Have a lamp test capability. Each generator in an 
isolated earth system shall have an earth fault 
monitor or insulation resistance monitor. 
 
5) Earthing and bonding electrodes 
All connections to the vessel’s hull or earth plate shall: 
a. Be accessible for inspection;  
b. Be secured by means of a screw or stud used for this 
purpose only with a diameter suited to the size of 
the earth conductor but not less than 6 mm;  
c. Be protected against corrosion; and  
d. Remain unpainted. 
 
Note:  Care should be taken to ensure bright metallic 
surfaces at the contact areas immediately before the nut 
or screw is tightened. The use of washers of a type that 
bite into the metal is recommended. To protect against 
electrolytic corrosion, care must be taken in the choice 
of metals and methods used to make the connection. 
Where necessary the joint should be protected with anti-
oxidation grease. Earth electrodes used for the 
connection of lightning protection to a vessel’s hull or 
earth plate shall not be used for connection of protective 
earthing, equipotential bonding or communication 
equipment earthing. 
 
6) Earth plates 
All electrical installations on vessels of non-metal hull 
construction shall incorporate an earth plate that 
complies with the following: 
a. The earth plate shall be: 
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i. Manufactured from copper or other material 
of equivalent mechanical and electrical 
properties; and  
ii. Securely attached with non-corrodible 
fastenings to the hull of the vessel. 
b. The earth plate shall be positioned so that it is 
immersed always during operation of the vessel.  
c. The earth plate shall have an area of at least 0.25 m2, 
and shall be at least 3.2 mm thick.  
d. Connections to the earth plate shall comply with 
clause.  
 
If   more than one earth plate is used, all earth plates shall 
be equipotential bonded. The same earth plate may be 
used for protective earthing, functional earthing of 
communications equipment, and lightning protection. 
Main earth (protective earth), functional earthing and 
lightning down conductors shall be run separately to the 
earth plate(s) and connected by separate electrodes to 
the earth plate(s). 
 
• Bonding 
Equipotential bonding shall: 
1) have a resistance to earth of less than 0.5 ohm; and in 
nonmetallic vessels, be provided between all engine 
bedplates, generator frames, metallic elements of the 
fuel system, fixed metal objects with a surface area more 
than 0.4m², and the earth plate.  
2) To help dissipate possible static build up and to minimize 
the effects of electrolytic corrosion it is recommended 
that metallic fittings, particularly those in con-tact 
with the sea, are bonded to the main earth system.  
 
6. Cables and wiring systems 
• Wiring systems  
Cable and wiring systems shall meet the requirements of IEC 
60092-352 and IEC 60092-401.  
• Duplicate supply  
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Where a duplicate or alternative supply is required (e.g. 
alternative supplies for the navigation light panel), the two 
cables shall be routed separately to avoid the risk of 
concurrent damage to both cables. 
 
7. Unacceptable components materials and methods 
The following components, materials and methods are not suited 
to the marine environment and shall not be used:  
• Re-wire able fuses.  
• Hull return, except for cathodic protection systems.  
• Aluminum conductors. 
 
8. Equipment and accessories in hazardous area 
Where practicable, electric equipment shall not be installed in a 
space where petroleum vapor or another hydrocarbon gas maybe 
accumulate. When equipment is installed in such a space it shall 
comply with a recognized standard for prevention of ignition of 
flammable atmosphere. 
 
9. Commissioning-inspection and testing 
• Tests 
At the conclusion of construction, modification, or repairs the 
electrical system, equipment or part shall be inspected and 
tested in accordance with IEC 92-401 before being put into 
service.   
 
Commissioning tests shall include, as a minimum, the correct 
operation (i.e. in accordance with manufacturers 
specifications and the objectives and requirements of this 
clause) of the following equipment where fitted :  
1) generator operation including: 
a. engine governors;  
b. parallel operation;  
c. load sharing;  
d. voltage regulator operation by instantaneous 
loading and unloading of generator; and 
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e. safety devices, such as overspeed trips, reverse 
power trips, over current trips, load shedding, 
together with the associated controls and alarms. 
2) load testing of motors;  
3) overload alarm circuits of essential service motors;  
4) main engine safety alarms and trips;  
5) machinery and equipment that incorporates remote 
controls, remote stops and limit switches;  
6) emergency stop circuits;  
7) vessel’s alarm systems; and  
8) other systems and equipment installed in the vessel. 
• Test results 
All test results shall be recorded and the test results shall 
remain with the vessel’s documentation. Test results should 
be dated, accurate, legible and retained for the life of the 
vessel. 
 
10. Designs parameters 
Unless otherwise specified, electrical equipment shall be designed 
for an ambient temperature of at least 45o C. 
 
4.4.2 Extra-Low Voltage System and Batteries 
1. Scope 
These rules are about the requirements for electrical equipment 
and electrical installations for extra-low voltage systems. (voltages 
up to 50 V a.c and 120 V d.c) 
 
2. Engine Starting Cables 
Engine starting cables shall: 
• Protected from mechanical damages; 
• Terminals protected from mechanical damages and from 
contacts with conductive materials; 
• Be as short in length as with the starter motor batteries; 
• Be routed to avoid the possibility of coming into contacts 
with flammable materials or sheathed with some material 
resistant to the effect of it; 
• Be of adequate size for the expected cranking current and to 
minimize voltage drop; 
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• Be connected directly to the starter via the starting relay 
contacts; and 
• Be suitably sealed at terminals in such a manner as to reduce 
corrosion. 
Notes: Cables size of starter motor should be based on 
manufacturers specification. The starting motor relay shall be 
mounted directly on the starter or adjacent to it. 
 
3. Switches and Circuit Protection 
In isolated systems, switches and circuit protection shall interrupt 
all active conductors i.e. double pole switches are to be used. 
 
4. Batteries and Battery Installation 
• Battery Isolation 
All batteries shall be controlled by an isolation switch 
operating in all active conductors. Isolation switches shall be 
located as close as practicable to the battery, and cables 
between the battery and isolating switch shall be double 
insulated or installed in a wiring enclosure throughout their 
entire length 
• Battery location and mounting 
a. Battery location 
To limit voltage-drop in cables, starting batteries should 
be located as close as practicable to the engines they 
serve while minimizing the risk of hydrogen released by 
the battery being ignited by a spark from the starter 
motor. 
b. Mechanical protection 
• Battery boxes 
Battery boxes shall be: 
a. Capable of containing the whole volume of electrolyte 
and using chemically resistant materials; and 
b. Mounted and arranged to prevent movement of the 
battery cause the motion of the vessel. 
• Battery compartments 
Batteries shall be mounted in drip trays or containers of a 
chemically resistant material that can contain the total 
volume of electrolyte. Mounting arrangements for the 
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containers and the batteries shall prevent movement of the 
battery cause the motion of the vessel. 
• Battery Housing 
Batteries, or sets of batteries, charged by chargers where the 
sum of all chargers is greater than 2 kW in total shall be 
housed in a compartment dedicated to batteries only.  
Battery compartments shall be well ventilated to the open 
deck. Cable entries to battery compartments shall be gas 
tight. 
• Switches in battery compartments 
Switches and other circuit interrupting devices shall not be 
housed in battery boxes, battery compartments or dedicated 
battery rooms.  These devices shall be mounted as close as 
practicable, but external to, these housings. 
• Battery protection 
Batteries supplying essential services, excluding engine 
starting batteries, shall have short circuit protection as a 
minimum protection for overcurrent. Engine starting 
batteries shall have either: 
a. Short circuit protection; or 
b. Mechanical protection of the starting cables. 
c. For all other battery circuits, short circuit and overload 
protection shall be provided. 
 
5. Ventilation of Batteries and Battery Compartments 
• General 
Ventilation is needed to avoid the accumulation of hazardous 
gases. The accumulation of hazardous gases can cause a risk 
of fire or explosion, so battery compartments, rooms, and 
boxes shall be ventilated. 
• Minimal exhaust rate 
The concentration of hazardous gases should be below 2 
percent. The minimum exhaust ventilation rate is needed by 
following formula (4.1): 
 
𝑞𝑣 = 0,006 × 𝑛 ×𝑙     (4.1) 
 
Where: 
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qv  = the minimum exhaust ventilation rate, in liters per 
second 
n = the number of battery cells 
l  = the charging currents, in amperes 
• Natural ventilation 
For natural ventilation, the minimum size of inlet and outlet 
vents is given by following formula (4.2): 
 
𝐴 = 100 × 𝑞𝑣      (4.2) 
 
Where: 
A = the minimum area of vent, in square centimeters 
qv  = the minimum exhaust ventilation rate, in liters per 
second 
• Mechanical ventilation 
Mechanical ventilation is needed to meet the minimum 
exhaust rate (qv) the following shall apply: 
a. exhaust air shall be discharged outside the ship’s 
structure;  
b. fans shall not be located within a duct (i.e. best mounted 
at discharge end of duct); 
c. exhaust ducting shall have a positive gradient over the 
full length of the duct and shall not connect to another 
ductwork; 
d. non-sparking material shall be used for fan blade and fan 
housing; 
e. controls for the fan shall be external to the compartment 
being ventilated; and  
f. air flow shall be monitored and an audio/visual flow 
alarm fitted. 
 
4.5 Fuel Oil System Recommendation 
Conditions that are not in accordance with the standards on the MV. 
Gili Cat II fuel oil system became the main cause of the explosion. 
These main caused are flammable material (Igniter, Flammable 
Material, and Oxygen). The conditions that are not in accordance with 
the fuel oil system in the vessel are: 
• There is a fuel spill when refueling 
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• Refueling procedures 
• Venting pipe system (design, condition, etc.) 
• Material used in the existing condition 
 
The fuel oil system equipment that will be evaluated and given 
recommendations in this thesis is only related to the fuel tanks, safety 
arrangements for power-operated fuel pumps and motors, additional 
requirements for fuel system, and Refueling safety tips based on NFPA. 
Recommendations on this system refer to NCVS Chapter V (Machinery 
& Electrical) standard and NFPA. Here is an explanation of the 
recommendation regarding electrical system in this thesis. 
 
4.5.1 Fuel Tanks 
1. Fuel tank types 
• Non-potable fuel tanks built-in 
Fuel tanks that are integral to the vessel’s hull structure 
• Non-potable fuel tanks freestanding. 
Fuel tanks that are not integral to the vessel’s hull structure, 
but fitted to or permanently located on the vessel 
• Portable fuel tanks. 
Fuel tanks of 25 liters capacity or less, and which are intended 
to be re-moved from the vessel for filling. 
2. Common requirements for non-portable fuel tanks of both free-
standing and built-in types 
• Location 
Location for non-portable fuel tanks shall not be fitted in the 
following locations: 
1) Over stairways and ladders.  
2) Over hot surfaces. 
3) Over electrical equipment. 
4) In any location near a source of ignition. 
• Pressure testing 
Non-portable fuel tank shall be pressure tested to 2.5 meters 
of fresh water above the top of the tank, or to the maximum 
head to which the tank may be subject to in service, 
whichever is the greater. Tank shall be tested before 
installation into the vessels. 
• Venting 
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Tank shall be vented into the open air. Area of the venting 
pipe shall not to be less than 1.25 times the area of the filling 
pipe if the tank is filling affected by pump. The pipe shall 
terminate in a gooseneck on the open deck. Where the 
diameter of the pipe outlet exceeds 18 mm, a corrosion-
resistant wire gauze screen shall be fitted. A short flexible 
section of hose of length no more than 760 mm may be 
incorporated into the vent pipe for vibration damping or to 
facilitate installation. Pipe shall be made of reinforced 
synthetic rubber of a type resistant to fuel, salt water and 
vibration. The flexible section of hose shall be fastened to the 
rigid section of the vent with two corrosion-resistant clips at 
each end. 
• Inspection opening 
The freestanding type and less than 800 liters capacity, shall 
be fitted with an inspection opening to facilitate cleaning and 
inspection. 
• Fuel shut-off 
A fuel shut-off valve shall be fitted in each tank outlet line. 
Nonmetallic piping and fittings shall not be fitted in the line 
between the tank and this shut-off valve. It located outside a 
machinery space in a position not likely to be isolated by a 
fire in the machinery space. They shall be capable of 
operating when exposed to flame and heat from a fire.  
• Filling pipes for non-portable fuel tanks 
Non-portable fuel tanks shall incorporate a permanent filling 
pipe. It should extend from the open deck to the tank.  
A short flexible section of hose of length no more than 760 
mm may be incorporated into the filling pipe for vibration 
damping or to facilitate installation. The flexible section 
of hose shall be fastened to the rigid section of the vent with 
two corrosion-resistant clips at each end. 
3. Specific requirements for built-in fuel tanks which are integral to 
the vessels hull structure 
• Arrangements 
Fuel tanks shall not be located forward of the collision 
bulkhead. 
• Fuels having a flashpoint below 60° C 
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Built-in fuel tanks shall not be used to contain fuels 
having a flash-point below 60°C. 
• Baffles 
Baffle plates shall be fitted in built-in fuel tanks to reduce the 
surging of the tank contents. 
4.5.2 Safety arrangements for power-operated fuel pumps  
1. Relief Valving 
Relief valve discharging back to the suction side of the pump shall 
be fitted, if the closed discharge pressure exceeds the maximum 
design working pressure of the discharge system. 
2. Stop valves 
Stop valves shall be fitted on the suction and discharge 
lines of cargo oil, fuel transfer and fuel pressure pumps. 
3. Means of stopping 
A fuel transfer pump or cargo oil pump shall be fitted with means 
to stop the pump from both inside and outside the space in which 
it is located.  The remote fuel transfer pump or cargo oil pump 
shut-down arrangements shall be capable of operating when 
exposed to flame and heat from a fire within the space containing 
the pump. 
4. Fuel filters 
Transparent filter casings of plastic or glass shall be resistant to 
both mechanical impact and thermal shock, and shall either be 
fitted with guards or located in protected positions. 
 
4.5.3 Additional requirements for fuel system 
1. Gravity feed fuel systems 
Gravity feed fuel systems shall not be used for the non-portable 
tanks of capacity more than 10 liters. 
2. Fuel tank capacity 
Non-portable fuel tanks should be no larger than that necessary 
for the intended service of the vessel, but should be of sufficient 
capacity to prevent them having to be filled while in service. 
3. Fuel tank contents measurements 
It used for determining the amount of fuel contained in the tank. 
The cap provided on the sounding pipe for the insertion of the 
sounding rod shall have a maximum clear opening of 15 mm 
diameter. 
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4. Fuel tank location 
Tank shall be securely installed in a location remote from the 
engine, exhaust pipes and other potential sources of ignite. 
5. Fuel filler pipe 
The fuel filler pipe for non-portable fuel tanks shall extend to a 
point close to the bottom of the tank. It used to reduce the 
backflow of inflammable vapors through the filling pipe. 
6. Inspection 
Tanks should be able to be inspected externally. 
7. Ventilation 
Each fuel tank shall also be fitted with a vent pipe, remote from 
the tank space vent, leading to a similar open space. They shall be 
separate and non-communicating, and shall be fitted with spark 
arresters (e.g. wire gauze diaphragms).  
NOTE:  Additional ventilation of the fuel tank space may be 
provided by a flameproof fan. Alternatively, a gas detector may 
be fitted, having an audible or visual alarm located at the control 
position.   
8. Electrical connections 
Electrical connections or wiring shall not be fitted anywhere within 
the tank space. 
9. Electrical bonding 
Electrical bonding shall be provided to protect against the 
possibility of a spark arising from static charge causing an 
explosion. Tanks shall be earthed so that resistance to earth is less 
than 10 ohms. 
10. Flexible piping 
Flexible pipe is used in the section of line between the engine bed 
and the fuel lift pump. It shall be resistant to heat, salt water, 
petroleum products and vibration and shall comply with a 
relevant national or international standard (SAE J 30 or 
equivalent). 
 
4.5.4 Refueling Safety tips based on NFPA 
1. Turn off vehicle’s engine when refueling. 
2. Keep gasoline and other fuels out of children's sight and reach. 
3. Do not smoke, light matches or use lighters while refueling. 
4. Pay attention when refueling. 
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5. If you must use any electronic devices, follow manufacturer’s 
instruction. 
6. Use only the refueling latch on the gasoline dispenser nozzle, if 
there is one. 
7. Use only the refueling latch on the gasoline dispenser nozzle, if 
there is one. 
8. After pumping gasoline, leave the nozzle for a few second to 
avoid drips. 
9. If a fire starts while you're refueling, do not remove the nozzle 
from the vehicle or try to stop the flow of gasoline. Leave the area 
immediately and call for help. 
10. Do not get in and out of your vehicle while refueling. It can cause 
electrostatic charge. 
11. If you must get into the vehicle during refueling, discharge any 
static electricity by touching metal on the outside of the vehicle, 
away from the filling point, before removing the nozzle from your 
vehicle. 
12. Use only approved portable containers for transporting or storing 
gasoline. 
13. Never fill a portable container when it is in or on the vehicle. 
14. When filling a portable container, keep the nozzle in direct 
contact with the container. Fill it only about 95 percent full to 
leave room for expansion. 
 
4.5.5 Tank Design Recommendation 
Tank design recommendation for MV. Gili Cat II is regarding to the 
NCVS Ch. V. In this recommendation, refueling for the tank is using 
appropriate pump. Pump that used in this recommendation is: 
• Brand  : HAINA PUMP 
• Type  : CYB-S-25-27 
• Capacity  : 3 m3/h 
• Head  : 27 m 
• RPM  : 2900 rpm 
• Shaft Power : 0,6 kW 
• Motor  : 3 phases 
• Frequency  : 50 Hz 
• Model  : YB801-2 
• Power  : 0,75 kW 
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Appendix 4 is described about detail calculation of pump and pipe 
selection, existing fuel tank design, and fuel tank design 
recommendation.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
Based on the evaluation conducted through the evidence obtained from the 
investigation of the NTSC, General Arrangements, Daily report of MV. Gili Cat 
II, incident reports, etc., then continued with the analysis using Apollo Root 
Cause Analysis method. From this analysis then obtained the root cause result 
of MV. Gili Cat II explosion. Then followed by recommending suggestions 
related to electrical systems and fuel oil systems. Here are result that can be 
produced: 
 
1. There are some conditions on the ship that became the main cause of 
the explosion. Conditions which cause an explosion as Igniter factors are: 
• Bad Electrical wiring system 
1. Tightening battery using a belt tied manually 
2. Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery 
3. Switch and contacts pole are not protected with isolator 
4. Battery Spaces is not in good condition 
5. There is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline 
space 
6. Brocken Socket 
• Static electricity around the tank and hull 
• There is no earthing system on tank 
2. Conditions which cause an explosion as flammable material factors are: 
• There is a fuel spill when refueling 
• Refueling procedures 
• Venting pipe system (design, condition, etc.) is not following the 
standard (NVSC Ch. V) 
• Material used in the existing condition 
3. Conditions which cause an explosion as oxygen factors are: 
• Compartment below deck is not watertight  
• Only using a spot welding  
4. The following recommendations related to Electrical system are: 
• Cable and wiring systems shall meet the requirements of IEC 60092-
352 and IEC 60092-401.  
• Engine starting cables shall: 
o Protected from mechanical damages 
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o Terminals protected from mechanical damages and from 
contacts with conductive materials 
o Be as short in length as with the starter motor batteries 
o Be routed to avoid the possibility of coming into contacts with 
flammable materials 
o Be connected directly to the starter via the starting relay 
contacts 
o Be suitably sealed at terminals in such a manner as to reduce 
corrosion. 
• Earthing: 
o For a.c system (above 50 V) shall be using a multiple earthed 
neutral (MEN) system or isolated earth system 
o For d.c system shall be using a negative earth or an isolated 
earth system 
• Batteries and Battery Installation: 
o All batteries shall be controlled by an isolation switch operating 
in all active conductors.  
o Starting batteries should be located as near as with the engine 
o Battery boxes shall use chemical resistant material and mounted 
or arranged to prevent movement of the battery cause the 
motion of the vessel. 
o Starting battery protection is needed. (Short circuit, Mechanical 
protection of starting cables, and overload protection) 
5. The following recommendations related to Fuel Oil system are: 
• Non-portable fuel tank shall be pressure tested to 2.5 meters of fresh 
water above the top of the tank. 
• Tank shall be vented into the open air. The pipe shall terminate in a 
gooseneck on the open deck. 
• Area of the venting pipe shall not to be less than 1.25 times the area 
of the filling pipe if the tank is filling affected by pump. 
• Where the diameter of the pipe outlet exceeds 18 mm, a corrosion-
resistant wire gauze screen shall be fitted.  
• A short flexible section of hose of length no more than 760 mm can 
be used for venting pipe and filling pipe. 
• Material of flexible pipe is using SAE J 30 or equivalent. 
• Using appropriate pump for filling tank cause tank capacity is more 
than 10 liters 
• Tanks should be able to be inspected externally. 
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• Tanks shall be earthed so that resistance to earth is less than 10 
ohms. 
• Safety arrangements for fuel pump and motors 
o Relief Valve 
o Stop Valve 
o Means of stopping 
o Fuel filters 
• Refueling procedures is following “Refueling safety tips based on 
NFPA” 
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Apollo Root Cause Analysis – RealityCharting Attachment 
 
 
1. General 
Apollo Root Cause Analysis – RealityCharting is used in this thesis. ARCA 
is recommended for event / Incident-based items of complex and higher 
significance. To complete the apollo root cause analysis, there are 4 steps 
that should followed. Four steps that should followed are:  
 
1. Define the problem. 
• What, When, and Where. 
• Significant: Safety, Environmental, Cost, etc. 
• Frequency of the problem. 
2. Create chart (Reality or Cause-Effect Chart). Chart is created 
supported with evidence. 
• Iterative process. 
• Look for an appropriate end to each part. 
3. Identify possible effective solution. 
• Brainstorm. 
• Not just the favorite solution. 
4. Implement best solution and Finalize the report. 
• Complete correction action. 
 
2. Define Problem 
Define the problem is the first step in Apollo Root Cause Analysis methods. 
At this stage, every detail of the problems will be explained, who will 
analyze the problem, an important note in the problem, the source of the 
data (reference), etc.  In this case, the problem of definition of 
RealityCharting application are explained in Figure 1. 
 
Then proceed to fill in the information about team members. Team 
members are those who would analyze the problems proficiency level. On 
Figure 2 will explain how your team members on a charging visualization 
RealityCharting application, as follows: 
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Figure 1 Problem Definition 
 
 
Figure 2 Team members 
 
The next stage is to fill an important note of this case. After fill an important 
note, so next step was filling reference. Figure 3 will explain about 
visualization to fill a RealityCharting reference on the application, as follows. 
As you create your chart, the software automatically Identifies the which 
causes are affected by the rule violations and will probably need further 
work.  
 
Figure 4 will explain how your visualization of RealityCharting rules check 
on the application, as follows. After rules check process has been 
completed and every rule check status has passed so all define problem 
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stages has been completed. It will proceed with the next step which is to 
the create chart.  
 
 
Figure 3 References 
 
 
Figure 4 Rules Check 
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3. Creating Chart 
Create chart is the second step in performing of apollo root cause 
analysis method. There is an important thing in creating chart of ARCA 
methods. Each chart should be supported by an evidence. Numbering of 
each chart is useful for reading the chart. In Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 
7 are described about numbering of each chart in this case. Detail root 
cause chart is described in Root Cause chart.  
 
 
Figure 5 Outline (Numbering) 1 
 
 
Figure 6 Outline (Numbering) 2 
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Figure 7 Outline (Numbering) 3  
 
4. Identify Possible Solution 
Identify Possible Effective Solution is a phase that we must follow to 
continue after creating chart. At this stage, team members will identify 
any effective solution that can be recommended. In recommending 
solutions in Apollo root cause analysis methods, there are several criteria 
check. The criteria check are described in Figure 8, In MV. Gili Cat II 
explosions, there are some recommendations solution that can be 
implemented solution. MV. Gili Cat II solution recommendations 
described in Figure 9, as follows: 
 
 
Figure 8 Criteria Check   
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Figure 9 Recommendation Possible Solution 
 
5. Implementing Best Solution 
Implement best solution is the stage where members choose the best 
solutions that have been recommended. In the solution assessment, there 
are several criteria. In conducting this assessment, there are several 
examples of criteria, such as the Figure 10 as follows: 
 
 
Figure 10 Solution Criteria Example 
 
But not all of the criteria I use in this solution assessment. Solution 
assessment example that I have done in this method is as follows as at 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 Solution Assessment Example 
 
6. Finalizing the report 
Finalize report is the last stage in the completion of Apollo Root Cause 
Analysis method. In the RealityCharting software, report creation process 
will be completed automatically. Here is the result of any incident report on 
the application RealityCharting. Finalize report described in Appendix 2. 
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Final Report of MV. Gili Cat II 
 
 
Realitychart Dashboard 
REALITYCHART DATA QUANTITY 
CAUSES 46 
    ACTIONS 17 
    CONDITIONS 29 
    UNDEFINED CAUSE TYPE 0 
    CAUSAL ELEMENTS 16 
OR LOGIC USED 2 
GO TO CONNECTIONS 0 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 7 
    PASSED CRITERIA CHECK, NOT 
IMPLEMENTED 
3 
    PASSED CRITERIA CHECK, 
IMPLEMENTED 
4 
    FAILED CRITERIA CHECK 0 
    WAITING FOR CRITERIA CHECK 0 
ACTION ITEMS 6 
    FIND EVIDENCE 0 
    FIND CAUSES 6 
    OTHER 0 
CAUSE PATH ENDINGS 31 
    DESIRED CONDITION 7 
    LACK OF CONTROL 17 
    NEW PRIMARY EFFECT 1 
    OTHER CAUSE PATHS MORE 
PRODUCTIVE 
0 
    OTHER 0 
    NEED MORE INFORMATION 6 
    REFERENCED REASON FOR 
STOPPING 
0 
TEAM MEMBERS 4 
    RICARD DIAGO SAMBUAGA 
 
        ASSIGNED SOLUTIONS 7 
        ASSIGNED ACTION ITEMS 0 
    DR. ENG. TRIKA PITANA, S.T., M.SC. 
 
        ASSIGNED SOLUTIONS 0 
        ASSIGNED ACTION ITEMS 0 
    IR. DWI PRIYANTA, M.SE. 
 
        ASSIGNED SOLUTIONS 0 
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        ASSIGNED ACTION ITEMS 0 
FILE LAST SAVED Jul. 24, 2017 8:55 PM 
FILE VERSION 7.5.12110 
 
REALITYCHART RULES CHECK 
RULE STATUS OCCURRENCES 
EMPTY CAUSE Passed 0 
UNCONNECTED CAUSE Passed 0 
ACTION/CONDITION 
TYPE 
Passed 0 
ACTION-CONDITION 
REQUIREMENT 
Passed 3 
CONJUNCTION Passed 7 
EVIDENCE Passed 0 
POINT OF IGNORANCE Passed 0 
 
RULE VIOLATIONS CAUSE 
CONJUNCTION Static electricity in the area of the tank 
and hull 
CONJUNCTION There is a gap between battery spaces 
and refueling pipeline space 
CONJUNCTION Wood boards and sponges used as a 
prop for battery 
CONJUNCTION Switch and contacts pole aren't 
protected with isolator 
CONJUNCTION Ship crews were spilling fuel when 
refueling 
CONJUNCTION There is no Appropriate Procedures for 
Refueling 
CONJUNCTION Gasoline on LEL and UEL range (1,4% - 
7,6%) 
ACTION-CONDITION REQUIREMENT Saturated gas accumulated 
ACTION-CONDITION REQUIREMENT Venting pipe in not good condition 
ACTION-CONDITION REQUIREMENT No gastight compartment 
 
References 
REFERENCES LINKED FILES 
1. NTSC MV. GILI CAT II REPORT NTSC MV. Gili Cat II Report (Draft) 
2. DEAN L. GANO. 
REALITYCHARTING - SEVEN 
STEPS TO EFFECTIVE PROBLEM 
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REFERENCES LINKED FILES 
SOLVING AND STRATEGIES 
FOR PERSONAL SUCCESS 
3. REFERENCE REMOVED 
 
4. LEL AND UEL RANGE FROM 
PERTAMINA.COM 
 
5. NCVS (Non-Conventional 
Vessel Standard) CHAPTER. V 
 
6. NFPA (NATIONAL FIRE 
PROTECTION ASSOCIATION) 
921 
 
 
LINKED REFERENCES SUPPORTING EVIDENCE REASONS 
FOR 
STOPPING 
NTSC MV. GILI CAT II 
REPORT 
• Bad electrical wiring system 
•  Static electricity in the area of 
the tank and hull 
• There is no earthing system 
• There is a fuel spill when 
refueling 
• Refueling pipe in not good 
condition 
• No watertight compartment 
• Tightening battery using a belt 
tied manually 
• Wood boards and sponges 
used as a prop for battery 
• Switch and contacts pole aren't 
protected with isolator 
• Battery spaces in not good 
condition 
• There is a gap between battery 
spaces and refueling pipeline 
space 
• Refueling manual not carefully 
• Lack of air circulation (saturated 
gas) 
• Saturated gas accumulated 
• Sounding pipe is closed and no 
longer used 
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LINKED REFERENCES SUPPORTING EVIDENCE REASONS 
FOR 
STOPPING 
• Bad electrical wiring system 
• Static electricity in the area of the 
tank and hull 
• There is no earthing system 
(grounding) 
• Ship crews were spilling fuel when 
refueling 
• Refueling pipe in not good 
condition 
• No gastight compartment 
• Ship crews tightening battery 
using a belt tied manually 
• Wood boards and sponges used as 
a prop for battery 
• Switch and contacts pole aren't 
protected with isolator 
• Battery spaces in not good 
condition 
• There is a gap between battery 
spaces and refueling pipeline 
space 
• Refueling manual not carefully 
• Air could not be circulated 
• Saturated gas accumulated 
• Sounding pipe is closed and no 
longer used 
• Not using standards material 
• Connection between hull wrang 
not exhaustive 
• Welding on the deck only using 
spot welding 
• Venting pipe in not good condition 
• Venting pipe mounting moved 
position 
• Venting pipe connection in not 
good condition 
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LINKED REFERENCES SUPPORTING EVIDENCE REASONS 
FOR 
STOPPING 
• Venting pipe folded 
• Venting pipe is easily removable 
• Plastic pipe is inserted between 
two pipe connections 
• There is an insulation tape 
blocking the hole in the pipe 
connection 
• Due to the modification, venting 
pipe folded forcibly 
• Material in not good condition 
• Venting pipe location is difficult to 
checked 
• Lack of appropriate pipeline 
• Not using standards material 
• There is no venting pipe in 
compartment beside tank 
• Battery Compartment isn't in good 
condition 
• Oxygen result dust particles being 
attracted to the rubbed surfaced 
LEL AND UEL 
RANGE FROM 
PERTAMINA.COM 
• Gasoline on LEL and UEL range 
(1,4% - 7,6%) 
 
 
Notes 
NOTES LINKED CAUSES 
1. REALITYCHART STATUS: THE 
INCIDENT REPORT HAS BEEN 
FINALIZED AND THE 
REALITYCHART CONTAINS 
ONE OR MORE RULE 
VIOLATIONS. 
 
2. RULES CHECK STATUS: SOME 
CAUSES HAVE BEEN 
PURPOSEFULLY LEFT OFF THE 
REALITYCHART. 
 
3. RULES CHECK STATUS: SOME 
CAUSE PHRASES CONTAIN 
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CONJUNCTIONS AND MAY 
REPRESENT MULTIPLE CAUSES. 
 
Team Members 
MEMBER NAME EMAIL INFORMATION 
RICARD DIAGO 
SAMBUAGA 
ricarddiagos@gmail.com Colllege Student 
DR. ENG. TRIKA 
PITANA, S.T., M.SC. 
pitanatrika@gmail.com 1st Supervisor 
IR. DWI PRIYANTA, 
M.SE. 
priyanta@gmail.com 2nd Supervisor 
ALEIK NURWAHYUDY aleiknurhayudy@gmail.com NTSC Investigator 
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Problem Definition 
Problem Definition 
What: Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II 
When:  
    Date: September 15th 2016 
    Time: 09:30 GMT+08:00 
Where: Bali 
    Location: Padangbai Port, Bali 
Significance:  
    Safety: Fires/Explosion 
    Environment:  
    Revenue:  
    Cost:  
    Frequency: 1 
 
Realitychart Outline 
ID CAUSE TYPE CAUSES 
1 
 
1.0 Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II 
4 Action 1.1 Heat 
41 Action 1.1.1 Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull 
49 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.1.1 There is no earthing system (grounding) 
68 Root 
Cause (A) 
1.1.1.2 oxygen result dust particles being attracted to the 
rubbed surfaced 
40 Condition 1.1.2 Bad electrical wiring system 
65 Action 1.1.2.1 Ship crews didn't check well 
66 Action 1.1.2.2 Ships crews didn't check regularly 
67 Condition 1.1.2.3 Battery Compartment isn't in good condition 
42 Root 
Cause (A) 
1.1.2.3.1 Ship crews tightening battery using a belt tied 
manually 
46 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.2.3.2 There is a gap between battery spaces and 
refueling pipeline space 
43 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.2.3.3 Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for 
battery 
45 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.2.3.4 Battery spaces in not good condition 
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ID CAUSE TYPE CAUSES 
44 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.2.4 Switch and contacts pole aren't protected with 
isolator 
63 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.1.2.5 Broken Socket 
3 Condition 1.2 Flammable Material 
26 Action 1.2.1 Ship crews were spilling fuel when refueling 
30 Action 1.2.1.1 Refueling manual not carefully 
61 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.1.2 There is no Appropriate Procedures for Refueling 
9 Condition 1.2.2 Gasoline on LEL and UEL range (1,4% - 7,6%) 
27 Root 
Cause (A) 
1.2.2.1 air could not be circulated 
28 Action 1.2.2.2 Saturated gas accumulated 
14 Condition 1.2.2.2.1 Venting pipe in not good condition 
16 Condition 1.2.2.2.1.1 Venting pipe folded 
18 Root 
Cause (A) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.1 Due to the modification, venting pipe folded 
forcibly 
22 Condition 1.2.2.2.1.1.2 Material in not good condition 
24 Action 1.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 Ship crews didn't check well 
53 Action 1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
23 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.2.3 Venting pipe location is difficult to checked 
19 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.2.4 Not using standards material 
20 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.1.1.3 Lack of appropriate pipeline 
15 Condition 1.2.2.2.1.2 Venting pipe connection in not good condition 
37 Action 1.2.2.2.1.2.1 Venting pipe is easily removable 
38 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.1.2.2 Plastic pipe is inserted between two pipe 
connections 
39 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.1.2.3 There is an insulation tape blocking the hole in 
the pipe connection 
13 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.2 Venting pipe mounting moved position 
60 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.2.3 There is no venting pipe in compartment beside 
tank 
47 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.2.3 No fuel indicator on tank 
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ID CAUSE TYPE CAUSES 
11 Condition 1.2.3 Refueling pipe in not good condition 
33 Action 1.2.3.1 Ship crews didn't check well 
52 Action 1.2.3.2 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
34 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.2.3.3 Not using standards material 
2 Condition 1.3 Oxygen 
6 Root 
Cause (A) 
1.3.1 Air come into compartment under deck 
5 Condition 1.3.2 No gastight compartment 
7 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.3.2.1 Connection between hull wrang not exhaustive. 
8 Root 
Cause (C) 
1.3.2.2 Welding on the deck only using spot welding 
 
RealityCharting Report 
For Internal Use Only 
 
Report Date: 2017-03-26 
Start Date: 2017-03-20 
Report Number: 2 
 
I. Problem Definition 
  What: Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II 
      Date: September 15th 2016 
      Time: 09:30 GMT + 08:00 
  Where: Bali 
      Location: Padangbai Port, Bali 
      Safety: Fires/Explosion 
      Frequency: 1 
 
II. Report Summary 
 
1. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
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condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe connection in not good condition caused by Easily 
removable and Plastic pipe is inserted between two pipe connections and There is 
an insulation tape blocking the hole in the pipe connection. Solution applied to 
Plastic pipe is inserted between two pipe connections is Using standard material 
owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
2. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. No fuel indicator on tank caused by 
Sounding pipe is closed and no longer used. Solution applied to Sounding pipe is 
closed and no longer used is Recommendation about piping system design owned 
by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
3. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe folded caused by Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. and Material in not good condition and Lack of appropriate 
pipeline. Solution applied to Due to the modification, venting pipe folded forcibly. 
is Recommendation about piping system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. Solution applied to Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. is Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and 
due on 
2017-03-27. 
   
4. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Bad 
electrical wiring system caused by Tightening battery using a belt tied manually and 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery and Switch and contacts pole 
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aren't protected with isolator and Battery spaces in not good condition and There 
is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space.. Solution applied to 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery is Using standard material 
owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. Solution applied to 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery is Recommendation about 
electrical system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
5. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Solution 
applied to Lack of ship grounding is Recommendation about electrical system 
design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
6. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Bad 
electrical wiring system caused by Tightening battery using a belt tied manually and 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery and Switch and contacts pole 
aren't protected with isolator and Battery spaces in not good condition and There 
is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space. Solution applied to 
Tightening battery using a belt tied manually is Recommendation about electrical 
system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 
2017-03-27. 
   
7. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Solution applied to Venting pipe connection in not good condition is 
Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
8. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
12 
 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe folded caused by Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. and Material in not good condition and Lack of appropriate 
pipeline. Material in not good condition caused by Ship crews didn't check well and 
Ship crews didn't check regularly and Venting pipe location is difficult to checked 
and Not using standards material. Solution applied to Venting pipe location is 
difficult to checked is Recommendation about piping system design owned by 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. Solution applied to Venting pipe 
location is difficult to checked is Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago 
Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
9. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe folded caused by Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. and Material in not good condition and Lack of appropriate 
pipeline. Material in not good condition caused by Ship crews didn't check well and 
Ship crews didn't check regularly and Venting pipe location is difficult to checked 
and Not using standards material. Solution applied to Not using standards material 
is Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-
27. 
   
10. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
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pipe folded. Solution applied to Venting pipe folded is Recommendation about 
piping system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
Solution applied to Venting pipe folded is Using standard material owned by Ricard 
Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
11. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system  and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Bad 
electrical wiring system  caused by Tightening battery using a belt tied manually 
and Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery and Switch and contacts 
pole aren't protected with isolator and Battery spaces in not good condition and 
There is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space. Solution 
applied to Switch and contacts pole aren't protected with isolator is 
Recommendation about electrical system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
12. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Solution applied to Venting 
pipe mounting moved position is Recommendation about piping system design 
owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. Solution applied to 
Venting pipe mounting moved position is Using standard material owned by Ricard 
Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
13. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Oxygen caused by Air come into compartment under deck 
and No watertight compartment. No watertight compartment caused by 
Connection between hull wrang not exhaustive. and Welding on the deck only 
using spot welding. Solution applied to Connection between hull wrang not 
exhaustive. is Welding according to standards owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
14. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Oxygen caused by Air come into compartment under deck 
and No watertight compartment. Solution applied to Air come into compartment 
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under deck is Welding according to standards owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
15. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Solution applied to No fuel indicator 
on tank is Recommendation about piping system design owned by Ricard Diago 
Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
16. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe folded caused by Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. and Material in not good condition and Lack of appropriate 
pipeline. Solution applied to Material in not good condition is Using standard 
material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
17. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Bad 
electrical wiring system caused by Tightening battery using a belt tied manually and 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery and Switch and contacts pole 
aren't protected with isolator and Battery spaces in not good condition and There 
is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space. Solution applied to 
Battery spaces in not good condition is Recommendation about electrical system 
design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
18. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Bad 
electrical wiring system caused by Tightening battery using a belt tied manually and 
Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery and Switch and contacts pole 
aren't protected with isolator and Battery spaces in not good condition and There 
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is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space. Solution applied to 
There is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space. is 
Recommendation about electrical system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
19. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe folded caused by Due to the modification, venting pipe 
folded forcibly. and Material in not good condition and Lack of appropriate 
pipeline. Solution applied to Lack of appropriate pipeline is Recommendation 
about piping system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-
27. 
   
20. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Saturated gas accumulated caused by Venting pipe in not good 
condition and Venting pipe mounting moved position. Venting pipe in not good 
condition caused by Venting pipe connection in not good condition and Venting 
pipe folded. Venting pipe connection in not good condition caused by Easily 
removable and Plastic pipe is inserted between two pipe connections and There is 
an insulation tape blocking the hole in the pipe connection. Solution applied to 
There is an insulation tape blocking the hole in the pipe connection is Using 
standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
21. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Flammable Material on LEL and UEL 
range caused by Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) and Saturated gas 
accumulated. Solution applied to Lack of air circulation (saturated gas) is 
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Recommendation about piping system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
22. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Solution applied to Refueling pipe in 
not good condition is Recommendation about piping system design owned by 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. Solution applied to Refueling pipe 
in not good condition is Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
23. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. There is a fuel spill when refueling 
caused by Refueling manually and Refueling isn't using an appropriate pump. 
Solution applied to Refueling isn't using an appropriate pump is Recommendation 
about piping system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-
27. 
   
24. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Refueling pipe in not good condition 
caused by Ship crews didn't check well and Ship crews didn't check regularly and 
Not using standards material. Solution applied to Not using standards material is 
Using standard material owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
25. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Solution 
applied to Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull is Recommendation 
about electrical system design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-
03-27. 
   
26. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Oxygen caused by Air come into compartment under deck 
and No watertight compartment. No watertight compartment caused by 
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Connection between hull wrang not exhaustive. and Welding on the deck only 
using spot welding. Solution applied to Welding on the deck only using spot welding 
is Welding according to standards owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 
2017-03-27. 
   
27. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Flammable Material caused by There is a fuel spill when 
refueling and Flammable Material on LEL and UEL range and Refueling pipe in not 
good condition and No fuel indicator on tank. Solution applied to There is a fuel 
spill when refueling is Recommendation about piping system design owned by 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
   
28. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Oxygen caused by Air come into compartment under deck 
and No watertight compartment. Solution applied to No watertight compartment 
is Welding according to standards owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 
2017-03-27. 
   
29. Ship Accident (Explosion) - MV. Gili Cat II caused by Match Strike and Flammable 
Material and Oxygen. Match Strike caused by Bad electrical wiring system and 
Static electricity in the area of the tank and hull and Lack of ship grounding. Solution 
applied to Bad electrical wiring system is Recommendation about electrical system 
design owned by Ricard Diago Sambuaga and due on 2017-03-27. 
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III. Solutions 
ROOT CAUSES SOLUTIONS OWNER DUE DATE 
• SHIP CREWS 
TIGHTENING 
BATTERY USING A 
BELT TIED 
MANUALLY 
• WOOD BOARDS AND 
SPONGES USED AS A 
PROP FOR BATTERY 
• SWITCH AND 
CONTACTS POLE 
AREN'T PROTECTED 
WITH ISOLATOR 
• BATTERY SPACES IN 
NOT GOOD 
CONDITION 
• THERE IS A GAP 
BETWEEN BATTERY 
SPACES AND 
REFUELING PIPELINE 
SPACE 
• THERE IS NO 
EARTHING SYSTEM 
(GROUNDING) 
• BROKEN SOCKET 
Recommendation about electrical system 
design 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 03/27/2017 
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ROOT CAUSES SOLUTIONS OWNER DUE DATE 
• OXYGEN RESULT 
DUST PARTICLES 
BEING ATTRACTED 
TO THE RUBBED 
SURFACED 
• NOT USING 
STANDARDS 
MATERIAL 
• NOT USING 
STANDARDS 
MATERIAL 
• THERE IS AN 
INSULATION TAPE 
BLOCKING THE HOLE 
IN THE PIPE 
CONNECTION 
• PLASTIC PIPE IS 
INSERTED BETWEEN 
TWO PIPE 
CONNECTIONS 
• WOOD BOARDS AND 
SPONGES USED AS A 
PROP FOR BATTERY 
• DUE TO THE 
MODIFICATION, 
VENTING PIPE 
FOLDED FORCIBLY. 
Using standard material Ricard Diago Sambuaga 03/27/2017 
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ROOT CAUSES SOLUTIONS OWNER DUE DATE 
• VENTING PIPE 
LOCATION IS 
DIFFICULT TO 
CHECKED 
• VENTING PIPE 
MOUNTING MOVED 
POSITION 
• VENTING PIPE 
LOCATION IS 
DIFFICULT TO 
CHECKED 
• VENTING PIPE 
MOUNTING MOVED 
POSITION 
• LACK OF 
APPROPRIATE 
PIPELINE 
• DUE TO THE 
MODIFICATION, 
VENTING PIPE 
FOLDED FORCIBLY. 
• AIR COULD NOT BE 
CIRCULATED 
• THERE IS NO 
VENTING PIPE IN 
COMPARTMENT 
BESIDE TANK 
Recommendation about piping system 
design 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 03/27/2017 
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ROOT CAUSES SOLUTIONS OWNER DUE DATE 
• THERE IS NO 
APPROPRIATE 
PROCEDURES FOR 
REFUELING 
• NO FUEL INDICATOR 
ON TANK 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• REFUELING MANUAL 
NOT CAREFULLY 
• SHIP CREWS WERE 
SPILLING FUEL WHEN 
REFUELING 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• THERE IS NO 
APPROPRIATE 
PROCEDURES FOR 
REFUELING 
Crews was given special training Ricard Diago Sambuaga 2017-03-27 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
Ship owner should recruiting the crew that 
has been certified 
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ROOT CAUSES SOLUTIONS OWNER DUE DATE 
• REFUELING MANUAL 
NOT CAREFULLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• REFUELING MANUAL 
NOT CAREFULLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
Work procedures based on ISM Code   
• WELDING ON THE 
DECK ONLY USING 
SPOT WELDING 
• CONNECTION 
BETWEEN HULL 
WRANG NOT 
EXHAUSTIVE. 
• AIR COME INTO 
COMPARTMENT 
UNDER DECK 
Welding according to standards   
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IV. Team Members 
NAME EMAIL INFORMATION 
RICARD DIAGO 
SAMBUAGA 
ricarddiagos@gmail.com Colllege Student 
DR. ENG. TRIKA 
PITANA, S.T., M.SC. 
pitanatrika@gmail.com 1st Supervisor 
IR. DWI PRIYANTA, 
M.SE. 
priyanta@gmail.com 2nd Supervisor 
ALEIK NURWAHYUDY aleiknurwahyudy@gmail.com NTSC Investigator 
 
V. Notes 
1. Realitychart Status: The Incident Report has been finalized and the 
Realitychart contains one or more rule violations. 
2. Rules Check Status: Some causes have been purposefully left off the 
Realitychart. 
3. Rules Check Status: Some cause phrases contain conjunctions and may 
represent multiple causes. 
 
VI. References 
1. NTSC MV. Gili Cat II Report 
2. Dean L. Gano. RealityCharting - Seven Steps to Effective Problem Solving 
and Strategies for Personal Success 
3. Reference Removed 
4. LEL and UEL Range from pertamina.com 
5. NCVS (Non-Conventional Vessel Standard) Chapter V 
6. NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 921 
 
RealityCharting Action Item Report 
ACTION ITEM LINKED CAUSES OWNER DUE 
DATE 
FIND OUT WHY Connection 
between hull 
wrang not 
exhaustive. 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
 
FIND OUT WHY Welding on the 
deck only using 
spot welding 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
 
FIND OUT WHY There is an 
insulation tape 
blocking the hole 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
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ACTION ITEM LINKED CAUSES OWNER DUE 
DATE 
in the pipe 
connection 
FIND OUT WHY There is no 
earthing system 
(grounding) 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
 
FIND OUT WHY Not using 
standards material 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
 
FIND OUT WHY oxygen result dust 
particles being 
attracted to the 
rubbed surfaced 
Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
 
 
RealityCharting Possible Solutions Report 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
RECOMMENDATION ABOUT 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 
Passed Yes Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
42 Ship crews tightening battery using a belt tied manually 
43 Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery 
44 Switch and contacts pole aren't protected with isolator 
45 Battery spaces in not good condition 
46 There is a gap between battery spaces and refueling pipeline space 
49 There is no earthing system (grounding) 
63 Broken Socket 
68 oxygen result dust particles being attracted to the rubbed surfaced 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
USING STANDARD MATERIAL Passed Yes Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
19 Not using standards material 
34 Not using standards material 
39 There is an insulation tape blocking the hole in the pipe connection 
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CAUSE ID CAUSES 
38 Plastic pipe is inserted between two pipe connections 
43 Wood boards and sponges used as a prop for battery 
18 Due to the modification, venting pipe folded forcibly. 
23 Venting pipe location is difficult to checked 
13 Venting pipe mounting moved position 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
RECOMMENDATION ABOUT 
PIPING SYSTEM DESIGN 
Passed Yes Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
23 Venting pipe location is difficult to checked 
13 Venting pipe mounting moved position 
20 Lack of appropriate pipeline 
18 Due to the modification, venting pipe folded forcibly. 
27 air could not be circulated 
60 There is no venting pipe in compartment beside tank 
61 There is no Appropriate Procedures for Refueling 
47 No fuel indicator on tank 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
CREWS WAS GIVEN SPECIAL 
TRAINING 
Passed No Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
24 Ship crews didn't check well 
33 Ship crews didn't check well 
30 Refueling manual not carefully 
26 Ship crews were spilling fuel when refueling 
53 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
52 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
61 There is no Appropriate Procedures for Refueling 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
26 
 
SHIP OWNER SHOULD 
RECRUITING THE CREW THAT 
HAS BEEN CERTIFIED 
Passed No Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
04-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
24 Ship crews didn't check well 
33 Ship crews didn't check well 
30 Refueling manual not carefully 
53 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
52 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
WORK PROCEDURES BASED ON 
ISM CODE 
Passed No Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
24 Ship crews didn't check well 
30 Refueling manual not carefully 
33 Ship crews didn't check well 
52 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
53 Ship crews didn't check regularly 
 
SOLUTION CRITERIA 
CHECK 
IMPLEMENT OWNER DUE 
DATE 
WELDING ACCORDING TO 
STANDARDS 
Passed Yes Ricard 
Diago 
Sambuaga 
2017-
03-27 
 
CAUSE ID CAUSES 
8 Welding on the deck only using spot welding 
7 Connection between hull wrang not exhaustive. 
6 Air come into compartment under deck 
 
 
27 
 
RealityCharting Solution Assessment Report 
Summary 
CRITERIA CRITERIA CRITERIA CRITERIA 
PROBABILITY OF 
RECURRENCE 
Ease of Implementation Effectiveness Total Cost 
WEIGHT Weight Weight Weight 
1 1 1 1 
RANKING Ranking Ranking Ranking 
1 (98-100%) TO 4 (0-2%) 1 (Difficult) to 4 (Easy) 1 (Not Eff.) to 4 (Very Eff.) 1 (Expensive) to 4 (Low-
Cost) 
 
CAUSE SOLUTION COMMENT CRITERIA 
(1) 
CRITERIA 
(2) 
CRITERIA 
(3) 
CRITERIA 
(4) 
• BAD ELECTRICAL WIRING 
SYSTEM 
• TIGHTENING BATTERY 
USING A BELT TIED 
MANUALLY 
• WOOD BOARDS AND 
SPONGES USED AS A PROP 
FOR BATTERY 
• SWITCH AND CONTACTS 
POLE AREN'T PROTECTED 
WITH ISOLATOR 
• BATTERY SPACES IN NOT 
GOOD CONDITION 
Recommendation 
about electrical 
system design 
` 2,67 3,33 3,67 2,33 
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CAUSE SOLUTION COMMENT CRITERIA 
(1) 
CRITERIA 
(2) 
CRITERIA 
(3) 
CRITERIA 
(4) 
• THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN 
BATTERY SPACES AND 
REFUELING PIPELINE 
SPACE. 
• LACK OF SHIP GROUNDING 
• STATIC ELECTRICITY IN THE 
AREA OF THE TANK AND 
HULL 
• NOT USING STANDARDS 
MATERIAL 
• MATERIAL IN NOT GOOD 
CONDITION 
• NOT USING STANDARDS 
MATERIAL 
• THERE IS AN INSULATION 
TAPE BLOCKING THE HOLE 
IN THE PIPE CONNECTION 
• PLASTIC PIPE IS INSERTED 
BETWEEN TWO PIPE 
CONNECTIONS 
• VENTING PIPE 
CONNECTION IN NOT 
GOOD CONDITION 
• WOOD BOARDS AND 
SPONGES USED AS A PROP 
FOR BATTERY 
Using standard 
material 
 3,33 3,67 4,00 3,00 
 
 
29 
 
CAUSE SOLUTION COMMENT CRITERIA 
(1) 
CRITERIA 
(2) 
CRITERIA 
(3) 
CRITERIA 
(4) 
• REFUELING PIPE IN NOT 
GOOD CONDITION 
• VENTING PIPE FOLDED 
• DUE TO THE 
MODIFICATION, VENTING 
PIPE FOLDED FORCIBLY 
• VENTING PIPE LOCATION 
IS DIFFICULT TO CHECKED 
• VENTING PIPE MOUNTING 
MOVED POSITON 
• VENTING PIPE LOCATION 
IS DIFFICULT TO CHECKED 
• NO FUEL INDICATOR ON 
TANK 
• REFUELING PIPE IN NOT 
GOOD CONDITION 
• VENTING PIPE MOUNTING 
MOVED POSITON 
• LACK OF APPROPRIATE 
PIPELINE 
• DUE TO THE 
MODIFICATION, VENTING 
PIPE FOLDED FORCIBLY 
• VENTING PIPE FOLDED 
• LACK OF AIR CIRCULATION 
(SATURATED GAS) 
Recommendation 
about piping 
system design 
 3,33 3,33 4,00 2,67 
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CAUSE SOLUTION COMMENT CRITERIA 
(1) 
CRITERIA 
(2) 
CRITERIA 
(3) 
CRITERIA 
(4) 
• REFUELING ISN'T USING 
AN APPROPRIATE PUMP 
• THERE IS A FUEL SPILL 
WHEN REFUELING 
• SOUNDING PIPE IS CLOSED 
AND NO LONGER USED 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• REFUELING MANUALLY 
• THERE IS A FUEL SPILL 
WHEN REFUELING 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
Crews was given 
special training 
 2,67 3,67 3,33 2,67 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• REFUELING MANUALLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
Ship owner should 
recruiting the crew 
that has been 
certified 
 2,67 3,67 3,67 2,67 
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CAUSE SOLUTION COMMENT CRITERIA 
(1) 
CRITERIA 
(2) 
CRITERIA 
(3) 
CRITERIA 
(4) 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• REFUELING MANUALLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK WELL 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
• SHIP CREWS DIDN'T 
CHECK REGULARLY 
Work procedures 
based on ISM Code 
 3,33 3,33 3,33 2,33 
• WELDING ON THE DECK 
ONLY USING SPOT 
WELDING 
• CONNECTION BETWEEN 
HULL WRANG NOT 
EXHAUSTIVE. 
• NO WATERTIGHT 
COMPARTEMENT 
• AIR COME INTO 
COMPARTEMENT UNDER 
DECK 
Welding according 
to standards 
 3,33 3,00 4,00 2,33 
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Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Root Cause (A)
oxygen result dust
particles being attracted
to the rubbed surfaced
Caused
By
Condition
Bad electrical wiring
system
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Condition
Material in not good
condition
Caused
By
Root Cause (A)
air could not be circulated
Caused
By
Condition
Battery Compartment
isn't in good condition
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
There is no earthing
system (grounding)
Caused
By
Action
Venting pipe is easily
removable
Caused
By
Primary Effect
Ship Accident (Explosion)
- MV. Gili Cat II
OR
Caused
By
Action
Static electricity in the
area of the tank and hull
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Action
Heat
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Condition
Flammable Material
Lack Of Control
Desired Condition
Caused
By
Condition
Venting pipe connection
in not good condition
More Info Needed
Desired Condition
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Wood boards and
sponges used as a prop
for battery
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Root Cause (A)
Air come into
compartement under
deck
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
There is an insulation
tape blocking the hole in
the pipe connection
New Primary Effect
Caused
By
Action
Ship crews didn't check
well
Lack Of Control
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Condition
No gastight
compartement
More Info Needed
Caused
By
Condition
Refueling pipe in not
good condition
Caused
By
Action
Ship crews were spilling
fuel when refueling
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
There is no venting pipe
in compartment beside
tank
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Plastic pipe is inserted
between two pipe
connections
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Action
Refueling manual not
carefully
Desired Condition
Lack Of Control
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Broken Socket
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
There is no Appropriate
Procedures for Refueling
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Venting pipe mounting
moved positon
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Battery spaces in not
good condition
Caused
By
Action
Saturated gas
accumulated
Lack Of Control
Lack Of Control
More Info Needed
Lack Of ControlCaused
By
Action
Ship crews didn't check
regularly
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Switch and contacts pole
aren't protected with
isolator
Desired Condition
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Not using standards
material
Lack Of Control
Lack Of Control
Caused
By
Action
Ship crews didn't check
well
Desired Condition
Desired Condition
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
No fuel indicator on tank
Caused
By
Root Cause (A)
Ship crews tightening
battery using a belt tied
manually
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Lack of appropriate
pipeline
Caused
By
Condition
Venting pipe in not good
condition
Lack Of Control
More Info Needed
More Info Needed
Caused
By
Action
Ships crews didn't check
regularly
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Welding on the deck only
using spot welding
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
There is a gap between
battery spaces and
refueling pipeline space
Caused
By
Action
Ship crews didn't check
regularly
Caused
By
Condition
Gasoline on LEL and
UEL range (1,4% - 7,6%)
Caused
By
Action
Ship crews didn't check
well
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Connection between hull
wrang not exhaustive.
Caused
By
Condition
Venting pipe folded
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Not using standards
material
More Info Needed
Caused
By
Root Cause (C)
Venting pipe location is
difficult to checked
Desired Condition
Caused
By
Condition
Oxygen
Caused
By
Root Cause (A)
Due to the modification,
venting pipe folded
forcibly .
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RealityCharting Solution Assessment Report (MV. Gili Cat II) 
 
A. Pengantar & Tujuan Kuisioner 
Kuisioner ini dibuat untuk mendapatkan data tugas akhir yang digunakan pada studi evaluasi ledakan MV. Gili Cat II. Penilaian 
yang dilakukan pada setiap solusi yang direkomendasikan. Pengisian kuisinoner dilakukan dengan cara menilai solusi-solusi 
yang direkomendasikan berdasarkan setiap kriteria yang ada. Kriteria pada kuisioner ini akan dijelaskan pada  Tabel 1. Pengisian 
pada kuisioner cukup diisi dengan score 1 hingga 4. Hasil dari kuisioner ini kemudian akan digunakan sebagai acuan untuk 
solusi yang akan diimplementasikan pada kasus MV. Gili Cat II.  
 
Tabel 1 Solution Criteria 
No. Criteria Score 
1 Probability of Recurrence 1 (98-1%) to 4 (-2%) 
2 Ease of Implementation 1 (Difficult) to 4 (Easy) 
3 Effectiveness 1 (Not Eff.) to 4 (Very Eff.) 
4 Total Cost 1 (Expensive) to 4 (Low-Cost) 
 
B. Deskripsi Kriteria 
• Probability of Recurrenece: Kemungkinan terjadinya kasus yang serupa terulang kembali. Maksudnya ialah, apabila suatu 
solusi diimplementasikan maka seberapa besar kemungkinan terjadinya kasus tersebut dapat terulang kembali. 
• Ease of Implementation: Kemudahan dalam implementasi. Makudnya ialah, seberapa sulit solusi tersebut 
diimplementasikan. 
• Effectiveness: Efektifitas. Maksudnya ialah, seberapa efektifkah solusi tersebut apabila diimplementasikan..  
• Total cost: Total biaya. Maksudnya ialah, seberapa besar biaya yang dikeluarkan apabila solusi tersebut diimplementasikan. 
 
 
 
Salam Ricard Diago Sambuaga 
2 
 
 
 
Mahasiswa J. T. Sistem Perkapalan, ITS. 
 
Contoh Pengisian Kuisioner:  
 
Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Bad electrical wiring system 
• Tightening battery using a belt 
tied manually 
• Wood boards and sponges 
used as a prop for battery 
• Switch and contacts pole aren't 
protected with isolator 
• Battery spaces in not good 
condition 
• There is a gap between battery 
spaces and refueling pipeline 
space. 
• Lack of ship grounding 
• Static electricity in the area of 
the tank and hull 
Recommendation 
about electrical 
system design 
 1 4 3 2 
 
Form Pengisian Kuisioner: 
 
Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Bad electrical wiring system 
• Tightening battery using a 
belt tied manually 
Recommendation 
about electrical 
system design 
`    
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Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Wood boards and sponges 
used as a prop for battery 
• Switch and contacts pole 
aren't protected with isolator 
• Battery spaces in not good 
condition 
• There is a gap between 
battery spaces and refueling 
pipeline space. 
• Lack of ship grounding 
• Static electricity in the area of 
the tank and hull 
• Not using standards material 
• Material in not good 
condition 
• Not using standards material 
• There is an insulation tape 
blocking the hole in the pipe 
connection 
• Plastic pipe is inserted 
between two pipe 
connections 
• Venting pipe connection in 
not good condition 
• Wood boards and sponges 
used as a prop for battery 
Using standard 
material 
    
 
4 
 
 
 
Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Refueling pipe in not good 
condition 
• Venting pipe folded 
• Due to the modification, 
venting pipe folded forcibly 
• Venting pipe location is 
difficult to checked 
• Venting pipe mounting 
moved positon 
• Venting pipe location is 
difficult to checked 
• No fuel indicator on tank 
• Refueling pipe in not good 
condition 
• Venting pipe mounting 
moved positon 
• Lack of appropriate pipeline 
• Due to the modification, 
venting pipe folded forcibly 
• Venting pipe folded 
• Lack of air circulation 
(saturated gas) 
• Refueling isn't using an 
appropriate pump 
• There is a fuel spill when 
refueling 
Recommendation 
about piping 
system design 
    
 
 
 
5 
 
Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Sounding pipe is closed and 
no longer used 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Refueling manually 
• There is a fuel spill when 
refueling 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
Crews was given 
special training 
    
 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Refueling manually 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
Ship owner should 
recruiting the crew 
that has been 
certified 
    
 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Refueling manually 
• Ship crews didn't check well 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
• Ship crews didn't check 
regularly 
Work procedures 
based on ISM Code 
    
 
6 
 
 
 
Cause Solution Comment Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4) 
• Welding on the deck only 
using spot welding 
• Connection between hull 
wrang not exhaustive. 
• No watertight compartement 
• Air come into compartement 
under deck 
Welding according 
to standards 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
Detail Calculation of pump and pipe 
selection, existing and recommendation of 
fuel tank design 
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General Data of MV. Gili Cat II
Length Overall : 11,69 m
Breadth Molded : 3,42 m
Draught : 0,60 m
Depth : 0,90 m
Gross Tonnage : 6 T
Net Tonnage : -
Type : Passenger Ship
Flag : Indonesia
Production Year : 2001
Production Location : Australia
Construction Material : Aluminum
a. Fuel oil Tank
Gasoline tank capacity = l
Report Data m
3
Tank design A = m
B = m
p = m
l = m
Vol = m
3
b. Calculation of Fuel oil transfer pump
Pump is planned to move gasoline from port to Fuel storage tank for 2 hour 
time (t) = hour
Volume = m
3
1500
1,5
0,5
0,35
4
0,9
1,53
2
1,5
1
2pumping capacity (Q) =
= m
3
/ h
= m
3
/ s
= l/min
so the internal diameter (D) of fuel filling pipe and vent pipe are:
Fuel filling pipe = 40 mm m
= inch
Vent Pipe = 20 mm
DNV No.2.21 Craft, Ch.5 Sec.4 C206
Filling pipe Internal diameter at least 38mm, vent pipe internal diameter at least 16 mm 
*
*
*
c. Selecting Pipe
The selected pipe based on ANSI for Main Pipe is 
Nominal Diameter = B 36.10
Inside Diameter = mm
Outside Diameter = mm
Thickness = mm
ANSI B36.10 Size 1 1/2
Q = A x v
Filling pipe and Feed pipe are using welded steel pipe combinate with flexible 
pipe
Flexible pipe shall satisfy the requirements of ISO 7840 Small craft fire 
resistant fuel hoses type A1 or A2
 At least two hose clips fabricated from stainless steel shall be used at each 
connection on flexible hose
1,5748
0,0002
12,5
3,7
48,3
40,9
0,04
V/t
0,75
v = Q / A
= m/s
d. Calculation for selecting filling pump
d.1 Head Static (hs)
hs = (port-tank height) + 0.5 [m]
= 1 m
d.2 Head velocity (hv)
hv = 0 m
d.3 Head pressure of pump (hp)
hp = 0 m
d.4 Head (suction)
* viskositas (u) = cst in 37,8ᵒC Cst
= n/10⁶
n = m²/s
* Reynold number (Rn)
Rn = (v*dH)/n Dimana : vs : flow velocity [m/s] m/s
= 0,166 m/s x  0,04 m / 0,71 m²/s x 10¯⁶ dH : Main bilge's pipe diameter [mm]
Head Velocity (hv) is the difference of flow velocity on suction side and 
discharge side. 
0,1659
0,1659
0,88
0,7137,8
15,6
0,00000071
Head Pressure is the diference of pressure on the suction and discharge. Because the 
pressure on the both side is same, sp thevalue of  hp = 0
0,71
Head Static (hs) is the diference of length of fuel suction and port .
C
3
4= (Turbulent flow) n : 0,71 x 10¯⁶ m²/s
Rn < 2320 (Laminar)
Rn > 2320 (Turbulent)
*
friction losses [(1/(f^1/2 )]     = -2 log ( 2,51/ Re f
1/2
) + (ε)/3,72*D )
Where :
absolute roughness (ε)= mm (weleded steel pipe)
diameter (D) = mm
Reynolds number (Re)=
if we use the colebrook equation formula calculator , so the friction factor is :
f =
* Major losses (hf) = f x L x v2 / (D x 2g)
Where : 
L = Length of pipe suction = m
g = Gravitasi = m/s²
So :
hf = m
* Minor losses (hm)
No n
1 2
0,045
40,9
Friction 
We use the colebrrok equation formula to know how much the friction factor of the 
pipe , here the equation :
9344,8
n x k
1,5
Accessories
Elbow 90
o
k
0,75
0,00261
2,3
9,8
0,03303887
9345
2 1
3 1
So, Minor Losses (hm) = Ʃ nk x v² / 2g
= m
* Total Head Suction
Total Head Suction = Major losses (hf) + Minor losses (hm) 
= 0,00261 + 0,0065
= m
d.5 Head (discharge)
* Minor losses (hm)
No n
1 1
So, Minor Losses (hm) = Ʃ nk x v² / 2g
= m
* Total Head Discharge
Total Head Discharge = Major losses (hf) + Minor losses (hm) 
= 0,00261 + 0
= m
d.6 Total Head Losses
Total Head Losses = Head Suction + Head Discharge
= m
0,01
2,5
Butterfly Valve 0,6
2,5Strainer
0,6
S nk
SDNRV remotely 1,35 1,35
S nk 1,35
0,0065
Accessories k n x k
4,6
0
0,00
0,01
5
6d.7 Head Total
Head Total = hs + hv + hp + Head Losses
= m
d.8 The Selected Pump's Spesification
Based on the calculation
Head : m
Capacity : m
3
/ h
Fuel oil filling pump
Merk : HAINA PUMPS Motor : 3 phase
Type : CYB-S-25-27 Frequency : Hz
Qapacity : m3 / h Model : YB801-2
Head : m Power : kW
RPM : rpm
Shaft Power : kW
1,01
0,75
3
0,6
0,75
50
27
2900
1,01
Fuel Tank
Saturated gas
Accum
ulated
(Explosion
Location)
Saturated gas
accum
ulated
(Explosion
Location)
Sounding pipe
closed
Fuel filling pipe and
pipe output connector
Unused venting
pipe
Venting pipe
connector
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